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Multinational CorporationsGovernmental Regulation of
Business Ethics Under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977:
An Analysis
Ruth Aurora Witherspoon*
I.

Introduction

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1977 to provide the United States with a jurisdictional basis by which it could
reach conduct widely engaged in by American companies doing
business in foreign countries. The Act seeks to proscribe the improper use of corporate funds for the payment of bribes, kickbacks,
political contributions and other questionable or illegal payments to
foreign government officials and others to secure business.
Undoubtedly, the law has been effective in the curtailment of
such conduct. Since passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
the United States has not been confronted with any major foreign
bribery scandals. Forceful arguments have been made, however,
that the law not only has effectively curtailed bribery, but that it has
curtailed the conduct of legitimate business as well. Fairly strong
evidence indicates that the Act indeed has caused unintended obstacles to the exercise of profitable, legitimate business.
The problems associated with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
have generated intensive deliberations. Critics in recent years have
noted the necessity of re-examining and clarifying the provisions of
the Act to reduce or eliminate uncertainties and anxieties for businessmen required to comply with the statute. Many plans have been
advanced and developed for the achievement of this clarification.
In view of the uncertainties and anxieties associated with comB.A. 1977, Hamilton-Kirkland Colleges; J.D. 1979, University of Cincinnati College
of Law; LL.M. 1982, University of Wisconsin Law School. Ms. Witherspoon is a law clerk for
the Honorable James E. Doyle, Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.

pliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, this article examines
the Act by looking first at the background against which it was enacted and its history and development. The article focuses on the
Act's operation and implementation and assesses the validity of criticisms directed at the Act and proposed solutions addressing those
criticisms. Finally, an attempt has been made to offer a practical
solution which does not debase the original goals of the Act.
II.

Statement and History of the Problem

The problem, stated simply, is that of corrupt practices. As used
herein, a corrupt practice is the use of corporate funds to bribe, i.e.,
to make questionable or illegal payments to, foreign government officials or foreign political parties, by American corporations and
others associated with them, to obtain or retain business. Bribery of
foreign government officials by American corporations, including
many of the largest and most established United States-based corporations, has occurred with such frequency that it has created serious
political, social and economic consequences for the international
business world.'
From an American political perspective, corrupt practices adversely affect the foreign policy interests of the United States; corrupt practices embarrass the United States and the recipient
countries and create strains in the United States' relations with
friendly foreign nations.2 Many argue that ample evidence supports
the contention that corrupt practices thus have an undermining effect
on United States foreign policy. One Congressman purported that
Chilean President Allende and Venezuelan President Perez terminated negotiations with the United States on compensation for nationalized property when they learned that American corporate
payments had been made to officials of those countries. 3 Others believe that the Italian Communist Party gained substantially in power
in the 1976 Parliamentary elections by exploiting the disclosures of
corporate payments made by American companies to Italian officials.4 "All of this lends substantial credence to the suspicions by
extremists that U.S. businesses operating in their country have a cor1. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., IstSess. 5 (1977); S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098.
2. Unlawful CorporatePayments Act of 1977: Hearings on HR 3815 and H.RA 1602
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate
andForeign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1977) (statement of Hon. W. Michael Blumenthal, then Secretary of the Treasury [hereinafter cited as Hearingson HR 381.5 and H.R.
1602].
3. Id at 169 (statement of Hon. Michael J. Harrington, then Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
4. Interview with Hon. William Proxmire, United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin, in Madison, Wisconsin (Oct. 10, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Proxmire].

rupting influence on their political systems."5
Corrupt practices may have been at least partly responsible for
political turmoil in such countries as Japan, Italy and the Netherlands.6 In Japan, former Premier Kakui Tanaka resigned in 1974
after having been indicted for accepting $1.7 million in bribes from
the Lockheed Corporation to help promote the sale of its airplanes. 7
It was said that the Lockheed affair and other revelations of corporate bribery "shook the government of Japan to its political foundations and gave opponents of close ties between the United States and
Japan an effective weapon with which to drive a wedge between the
two nations."8
In the Netherlands, bribes were allegedly paid to Prince Bernhard in the royal family, and "the monarchy itself nearly collapsed." 9 In Italy, President Giovanni Leone was accused of
accepting bribes from the Lockheed Corporation.'I These and other
payments to Italian officials were said to have "eroded public support for that government and jeopardized U.S. foreign policy, not
only with respect to Italy and the Mediterranean area, but with respect to the entire NATO alliance as well."'"
From a social perspective, business transactions that generate
the payment of questionable or illegal payments are morally repugnant; such transactions are thought to corrupt not only the recipient,
but the giver as well.' 2 Also, corrupt practice damage the reputations of American corporations in general and, in particular, the reputations of top executives of those corporations which engage in such
3
practices.'
Viewed from an economic perspective, payments made for purposes of obtaining or retaining business are so contrary to the notion
of a free enterprise system that the marketplace is undermined. In
such situations, price and quality, the fundamentals of fair competition, no longer control, and "business is directed not to the most effi5. Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearingson H.R 15481, S. 3664, HA 13870 and H.R.
13953 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protectionand Finance ofthe House Comm. on Interstate andForeign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (statement of Hon. John M. Murphy,
then Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 15481, S. 3664, H.R 13870 and H.R. 13953].
6. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note I, at 5; Sen. Proxmire, supra note 4.
7. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1974, at 3, col. 5.
8. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 1, at 5.
9. Sen. Proxmire, supra note 4.
10. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1978, at I, col. 3.
It. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note i, at 5.
12. Id
13. Id. at 4-5. [The United Brands Company experience is often referred to as a prime
example of the irreparably damaging effects that corrupt practices have had, and could have,
upon corporations and their officials. After United Brands had paid an Honduran official
$1.25 million to reduce a new export tax on bananas, the company's chief executive officer
committed suicide. See Note, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: Curse or Cure,? 19 AM. Bus.
L.J. 73, 74 (1981)].

cient producer, but to the most corrupt."14 Furthermore, the
consumer becomes the victim when the cost of the bribes is passed
on to him in higher prices and lower quality goods and services.I 5 In
addition, if the consumer is a shareholder of a company that engages
in the practices of bribery, then he may also bear the cost of those
bribes in the form of reduced dividends.
Although the practice of bribery is not new 16 the Watergate
scandals and the resultant investigation of illegal domestic political
contributions brought initial attention to the prevalence of questionable or illegal foreign payments. 17 Revelations of illegal foreign
payments in the 1970's highlighted the magnitude of the problem
and generated not only an enormous amount of publicity,' 8 but also
numerous denunciations by members of both the public and private
sectors of the American population. 19
Congress found itself confronted with the task of resolving the
problem of corrupt practices by American corporations. The legislature addressed three preliminary considerations. First, it searched
for existing United States laws that governed improper use of corporate funds for payments to foreign officials. Second, Congress examined those laws to determine their sufficiency for creating
effective United States action to deter such payments. Third, if the
existing laws were ineffective or insufficient, Congress contemplated
the appropriate legislative response.
A.

Pre-existent U.S. Laws

No law in the United States before 1977 explicitly prohibited
American companies from paying bribes to foreign government officials. Various laws however provided, albeit indirectly, means by
which to deter the improper foreign payments practices of American
corporations.
14. H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 1, at 5; Hearings on HR, 15481, S. 3664, H.R. 13870
and H.R. 13953, supra note 5, at 200-02 (statement of Leonard C. Meeker, Atty., Center for
Law and Social Policy).
15. Hearings on H.R. 15481, S.3664, HR 13870 and HR. 13953, supra note 5, at 83
(statement of Gerald L. Parsky, then Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Dept. of
Treasury).
16. It has been said that bribery is as old as civilization itself. See, e.g., T. GLADWIN & I.
WALTER, MULTINATIONALS UNDER FIRE: LESSONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT, ch.

9 Questionable Payments (1980).
17. Hearingson H.R. 15481, S.3664, H.R. 13870 andHR. 13953, supra note 5, at 1. See
also Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of1977: A TransactionalAnalysis, 13 J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 367 (1979), reprinted in 1979 SEC. L. REV. 589.
18. The revelations of corporate bribery of foreign officials received much attention from
the media. At various times many of the major U.S. newspapers published reports every day.
19. Very few Americans felt they did not have to make public denunciations.

B.

The Securities Laws

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has primary
responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the United
States securities laws. The ultimate purpose of the Securities Act of
193320 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,21 is to protect the
investing public. Under those Acts, companies that offer securities to
the general public are required to file and disclose information concerning their business and financial affairs.22
Although no specific provision in either the 1933 Act or the 1934
Act prohibits the making or requires the disclosure of corporate payments to foreign officials, certain provisions, at least arguably, are
relevant to the issue of improper payments. The anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act prohibit misrepresentation, deceit and other
fraudulent practices by issuers of registered securities. In addition,
the disclosure provisions of the 1934 Act require a company to disclose all material information. Information is material if a reasonable man might have considered it important in the making of his
investment decision.2 3
The SEC has taken the position that the use of corporate funds
for the making of questionable or illegal payments to foreign officials
is material information that is required to be disclosed.2 4 As early as
1973 the SEC, recogizing that American corporations may have been
in violation of the federal securities laws, embarked upon its own
investigations of the international bribery practices of American
firms. 25 To facilitate its investigations, the SEC utilized two means
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1976).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1976).
22. The requirement that issuers of registered securities make honest, adequate and
timely disclosures concerning their corporate affairs is "not only for the benefit of those to
whom and by whom the securities are proposed to be offered and sold, but also for the entire
market place and general public as well." W. PRIFTI, SECURTIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 263, at 244 (1974) (citing Atlantic Research Corp., 41 SEC 733 (1963)).
23. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). Information
may be material if it encompasses any fact
which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities . . . . Thus, material facts include not only information

disclosing the earnings and distributions of a company but also those facts which
affect the probable future of the company and those which may affect the desire of
investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis supplied) [cited in
Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings on S.3133, S.3379 and S.3418 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976) (letter
of Elliot L. Richardson, ex-Secretary of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.3133,
S.3379 and S.34181.
24. See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES TO THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC
REPORT].
25. On March 8, 1974, the SEC published a statement expressing its view concerning the
disclosure of foreign payments. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5466 (March 8,

1974).

by which it expected to uncover the extent of these practices: its "enforcement program" and its "voluntary disclosure program."
Under the "enforcement program," the SEC's investigations revealed that many corporations had in fact made questionable or illegal payments and had maintained false and inadequate corporate
books and records in their efforts to conceal those payments. 26 Because these facts, deemed by the SEC to be material, had not been
disclosed, the Commission alleged violations of the federal securities
laws and instituted several enforcement actions against those corporations. The Commission's enforcement actions sought injunctive
relief to prevent the future concealment of illegal or questionable
transactions and, in some cases, ancillary relief to require implementation of preventive measures.27
Although the SEC was effective in uncovering corrupt practices, 28 the pervasiveness of the practice and the Commission's limited personnel necessitated the finding of additional means by which
to uncover other possible violations. 29 Thus, the Commission instituted its "voluntary disclosure program." Under this program companies were encouraged to conduct in-house investigations of their
activities and were asked to come forth and disclose the material
facts related to any questionable or illegal payments uncovered. °
By the end of 1976 more than 450 companies "voluntarily" admitted
that they had made over 300 million dollars in questionable or illegal payments to foreign officials or in political contributions, for
which a full and accurate accounting was not made of the corporate
funds involved. 3'
The securities laws and the SEC's efforts in this area, however,
26. SEC REPORT, supra note 24. See also Abuses of CorporatePower: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Prioritiesand Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (statement of Hon. Roderick M. Hills, then Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Abuses of CorporatePower].
27. SEC REPORT, supra note 24. The ancillary relief often required "full-scale investigation, by disinterested outside counsel, of the facts and circumstances concerning questionable
transactions at the companies involved, appropriate disclosure of the results to shareholders,
and the implementation of preventive measures designed to safe-guard [sic] against repetition
of this conduct." Hearings on H.R 3815 and H.R. 1602, supra note 2, at 214-15 (testimony of
Hon. Harold M. Williams, then Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
28. See Hearings on HR. 3815 and H.R. 1602, supra note 2, at 165 (statement of Hon.
John E. Moss, then Representative from the State of California).
29. SEC REPORT, supra note 24. See also I Y. KUGEL, J. CARRO & N. COHEN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESs ETHICs 35 (Supp. 1981).
30. [A company's participation in the "voluntary disclosure program" did not immunize
it from Commission action, but did diminish the possibility that the Commission would proceed against the company.] SEC REPORT, supra note 24. Not only were companies expected
to come forth and disclose the material facts related to any transactions involving questionable
or illegal payments, but also "one of the key elements of the voluntary program is that there be
an immediate declaration of cessation of activities." Hearings on Abuses of CorporatePower,
supra note 27, at 23 (statement of Hon. Roderick M. Hills, then Chairman, Securities and

Exchange Commission).
31.

Id.; H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note I, at 4.

were considered insufficient fully to deter improper payments 32 for
several reasons.33 Most importantly, the securities laws do not apply
to every American company, but apply only to companies that are
required to file with or report to the SEC pursuant to the Securities
Act of 193334 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 31 Thus, for
example, of the more than 30,000 U.S. exporters, only approximately
25 percent of them are subject to deterrence from corrupt practices
by the securities laws.36
C. The Tax Laws

While the Internal Revenue Code does not specifically prohibit
the making of improper payments to foreign officials, some provisions of the tax laws do have particular relevance to the issue of improper payments. Section 162(c) disallows tax deductions for any
bribes, kickbacks or other payments made, directly or indirectly, to
any government official or agent, or any person, if those payments
would be illegal if made in the United States. 37 Thus, an American
company could not bribe a foreign official and then attempt to deduct from its gross income the amount of that bribe on its corporate
tax return because the United States has a domestic bribery statute
that prohibits the making of such payments. In addition, if an
American company derives subpart F income, i.e., income from a
controlled foreign subsidiary, it cannot take deductions for payments
made by its foreign subsidiary if the payment would be illegal if
made in the United States.3" In fact, in reporting subpart F income,
a company must include the amounts of any illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments made.39
32. See Hearings on S.3133, S.3379 and S.3418, supra note 23, at 52 (letter of Elliot L.
Richardson, ex-Secretary of Commerce); Hearings on Abuses of CorporatePower, supra note
26, at 95 (statement of Ralph Nader, consumer advocate).
33. Three reasons the securities laws were considered insufficient are: (I) "[s]ome of the
more important U.S. firms doing business abroad are private companies which are not subject
to the SEC disclosure requirements;" (2) "the Commission's authority to require disclosure is
limited in that a questionable payment must be reported only if it is 'material';" and (3) "the
SEC does not require disclosure of the names of the recipients of questionable payments and it
" Hearings on S.3133, S.3379 and S.3418, supra note 23,
is hard to see how it could do so ..
at 53-55 (letter of Elliot L. Richardson, ex-Secretary of Commerce). Others have argued that
the securities laws are inadequate because the penalties for violation of those laws are insubstantial, particularly because the SEC often concludes its cases with consent decrees. Hearings
on Abuses of Corporate Power, supra note 25, at 95 (statement of Ralph Nader, consumer
advocate).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1976).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1976).
36. See N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS, & R. EELLS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD
BUsInESS, Introduction (1977).
37. I.R.C. § 162(c)(1), (2) (1981).
38. The same prohibition against deducting illegal payments applies even if the American company is a DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporation). Cf. I.R.C. § 995(a),
(b)(F)(iii) (1981) (which makes illegal payments "deemed distributions" and therefore taxable
as dividends).
39. The amounts of any illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments made and reported

Concerned over the large number of revelations of questionable

or illegal payments made by United States companies, the IRS initiated its own investigation into these practices. The IRS feared that

corporations were devising schemes, such as the maintenance of

"slush" funds, which were outside the corporations' internal audit
controls.4 0 In August 1975, the IRS issued guidelines to aid its field
examiners in their efforts to uncover "slush" funds and other such
schemes.4 This first stage of the investigation involved the identification of "slush" funds and the illegal deductions of improper domestic as well as foreign payments. A year later, however, the IRS
focused its investigations on illegal deductions of improper foreign
payments and issued additional guidelines for the detection of such
payments.4 2

As part of its regular audit procedure the IRS began issuing, in
June 1976, an "eleven-questions" questionnaire to the major United
States corporations.4 3 This questionnaire was designed to detect
whether corporations had "slush" funds or were engaged in other

illegal activities in violation of the federal tax laws. The questions
were asked of officers and other individuals who would have "suffi-

cient authority, control or knowledge of corporate activities to be
aware of the possible misuse of corporate funds."'
Within three
months of the initiation of the questionnaire procedure, the IRS had
uncovered over 270 cases in which corporations had engaged in ille45
gal activities.
The tax laws, however, were also considered insufficient to deal

effectively with the problem of corrupt practices, 46 primarily because
as subpart F income, are considered "dividends" and are therefore taxable. See I.R.C. § 952
(1981).
40. Internal Revenue Manual Supplement 42G-378, 40G-133, 47G-229, 82G-90, 84G-14, &
9G-75, at 7451 (Feb. 23, 1978) reprintedin 1 Y. KUGEL, J. CARRO & N. COHEN, GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF BUSINESS ETHICS 19 (Supp. 1981) (hereinafter cited as Internal Revenue Manual Supplement, Feb. 23, 1978].
41. Hearingson S.3133, S.3379 and S3418, supra note 23, at 47 (letter of Elliot L. Richardson, ex-Secretary of Commerce).

42. Id. Internal Revenue Manual Supplement 42G-348, CR40G-119, 47G-11, & 93G-168
(renumbered 93-22) (May 10, 1976) (superseded by Supplement 42G-378, 40G-133, 47G-119,
82G-90, 84G-14, & 9G-75 (Feb. 23, 1978).
43. Hearings on HR. 3815 and HR. 1602, supra note 2, at 184 (statement of Hon. W.
Michael Blumenthal, then Secretary of the Treasury). On February 16, 1978 the IRS modified
the questions and reduced the number of questions from eleven to five. InternalRevenue Manual Supplement, Feb. 23, 1978, supra note 40.
44. InternalRevenue Manual Supplement, Feb. 23, 1978, supra note 40. The responses to
the questions must be reduced to writing and signed by the respondent in either affidavit form
or under written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.
45. Hearings on HA 3815 and HR 1602, supra note 2, at 184 (statement of Hon. W.
Michael Blumenthal, then Secretary of the Treasury). Under the tax laws a corporation which
deducts an improper payment may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. I.R.C. § 6653
(1981).
46. The IRS questionnaire program was thought to be inadequate because there is a
potency for abuse of administrative discretion. Ad Hoc Co, on Foreign Payments ofthe Assoc.
of the Bar of the City ofNew York Report on QuestionableForeign Paymentsby Corporations:

of their limited applicability. The tax laws do not directly proscribe
bribery of foreign officials; the laws merely prohibit the conduct of
deducting the amount of those bribes from the gross income of the
corporation.
D.

The Antitrust Laws

The essence of the United States antitrust laws is that competition should be based on efficiency, and thus, under those laws businesses compete on the basis of merit.47 The antitrust laws proscribe
unfair practices or unfair methods of competition. When a bribe is
paid for the purpose of influencing or inducing a foreign official's
assistance in obtaining or retaining business, an element of unfairness is injected into the competition. The payment of bribes by one
company places those companies that do not engage in such practices at a disadvantage because the efficiency of a company's products or services is no longer the dominant element of the competition
for business. Three major antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act, 48 the
Federal Trade Commission Act 49 and the Robinson-Patman Act,5 0

could apply to the practice of bribing foreign officials to obtain or
retain business.
1. The Sherman Act.-The Sherman Act prohibits United

States companies from engaging in practices that operate to restrain
trade5 ' or to monopolize52 the marketplace. Although the payment
of bribes is a practice that, at least arguably, could operate to restrain
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, that section cannot be used to reach every instance or form of bribery by American
companies. For a prosecution to be successful under section 1, it
must be shown that the violator contracted or conspired to restrain
trade. Thus, section 1 of the Sherman Act would reach the practice
of corporate bribery of foreign officials only in those few instances
where at least two or more U.S. companies conspired to bribe a foreign official.53
The Problem andApproaches To A Solution (Mar. 14, 1977), reprinted in Hearings on HR. 3815
and HR. 1602, supra note 2, at 85 [hereinafter cited as Bar Association Report on Questionable
Foreign Payments by Corporations].
47. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977), reprinted in I Y. KUGEL, J. CARRO & N. COHEN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS ETHICS 52 (Supp. 1978).

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

15
15
15
15
15

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§§

1, 2 (1976).
§ 45 (1976).
§ 13(c) (1976).
§ 1 (1976).
§ 2 (1976).

53. Although the issue has not been decided in court, some people believe that the recipient of the bribe, or an intermediary who passes on the bribe, could be found to be a coconspirator with the corporate payor. Bar Association Report on Questionable Foreign Pay-

ments by Corporations, supra note 46, reprinted in Hearings on H.A 3815 and H.A 1602, supra

Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not require a conspiracy.
That section would be applicable to the payment of foreign bribes
even if an American company acted alone. The bribes must, however, operate to exclude all other competitors and grant the corporate payor a monopoly of that foreign market. Thus, to establish a
section 2 violation, it must be shown that through the payment of
bribes, a company monopolized or attempted to monopolize some
foreign market.5 4
2. The Federal Trade Commission A ct.-The Federal Trade
Commission Act makes the use of unfair practices unlawful and empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prevent such practices.55 The FTC has taken the position that payments of bribes by
U.S. companies to foreign officials are unfair methods of competition because the payor companies use unfair practices, i.e., the paying of bribes, to gain unfair advantages over other companies. 56
The FTC Act may be a more effective deterrent to the payment
of foreign bribes by American companies than the Sherman Act because the FTC Act's applicability is not limited to conduct involving
a conspiracy, nor is it limited to conduct which amounts to a monopoly. The FTC Act, however, also has its limitations. It does not proscribe the payment of bribes by an American company to gain a
business advantage over a foreign competitor.57 In addition, the Act
does not apply to those bribes which are made for a purpose other
than that of obtaining or retaining business. Thus, the FTC Act
would not apply to those bribes that are made for the purpose of
gaining favorable legislation abroad. 58
3. The Robinson-PatmanAct (The Clayton Act).-Section 2(c)
of the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act makes it
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to make or receive
payments as commissions or allowances, except for services rendered
note 2, at 85-86. In addition, the doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy is considered applicable to section 1 of the Sherman Act where a U.S. company and its foreign subsidiary conspire
to make illegal payments. See also I Y. KUGEL, J. CARRO & N. COHEN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESs ETHIcs 38 (Supp. 1981) (citing Perma-Life Mufflers v. International
Pans, 392 U.S. 134 (1968)).
54. It has been said that section 2 of the Sherman Act would only be applicable in a few,
unusual cases, e.g., "where there is a finding that the briber has sufficient power in a defined
market to permit the inference that there is a reasonable probability it will be successful in
excluding its competitors from that market." Bar Association Report on Questionable Foreign
Payments by Corporations, supra note 46, reprinted in Hearings on H.R 3815 and HR.fl 1602,
supra note 2, at 86.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
56. Bar Association Report on QuestionableForeign Payments by Corporations,supra note
46, reprintedin Hearingson HA 3815 andHR. 1602, supra note 2, at 86.
57. Hearingson S.3133, S.3379 and S.3418, supra note 23, at 48 (letter of Elliot L. Rich-

ardson, ex-Secretary of Commerce).
58. Id

in connection with the sale or purchase of goods.5 9 The Act has been
interpreted by United States courts to apply to commercial bribery6"
as well as to foreign commerce. 6 '
Among the laws in force in the United States before 1977 the

Robinson-Patman Act had the greatest deterring effect upon the
problem of improper payments. It declares unlawful not only the
payment of bribes, but, the receipt of such payments as well. The
deterrent effect is weakened, however, by the fact that violations of

the Robinson-Patman Act do not evoke criminal sanctions.62
E.

Summary

Pre-FCPA laws, while providing some means by which the U.S.
could exercise authority over this conduct, were limited. Not one of
the pre-FCPA laws discussed above, is sufficiently broad enough,
with respect to either its coverage or its proscriptions, to be applicable to every instance of American corporate bribery of foreign officials. The limitations of the pre-FCPA laws loaned support to the
position that new legislation was needed to deal adequately with the
problem of improper corporate payments to foreign officials.6 3
III. The Solution-Passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977
On December 19, 1977, President Carter signed into law the
59.

15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).

60.

Y. KUGEL, J. CARRO & N. COHEN, I GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS ETH-

iCs 40 (Supp. 1981) (citing Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light and Power Co., 136 F.2d 12, 16
(6th Cir. 1943)).
61. Id at 41 (Supp. 1981) (citing Canadian Ingersoll v. Loveman, 227 F. Supp. 829, 833
(N.D. Ohio 1964).
62. Injunctive relief, however, can be sought in a court of equity, and a cease and desist
order may be issued as a result of a Federal Trade Commission proceeding. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 25 (1976).
63. Those who urged the enactment of new legislation included the following: Ralph
Nader, consumer advocate, see Hearings on Abuses of Corporate Power, supra note 26, at 91
(statement of Ralph Nader); Elliot L. Richardson, ex-Secretary of Commerce, see Hearings on
HR. 15481, S.3664, H.R. 13870 and HR_ 13953, supra note 5, at 39, 51 and Hearings on
S.3133, S.3379 and S.3418, supra note 23, at 51 (statements of Elliot L. Richardson).
Others, including the following, did not think that new legislation was needed: (1) The
Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign Payments of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York; (2) the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; (3) the National Association of Manufacturers,
which believed that the real problem was a lack of law enforcement; and (4) Gerald L. Parsky,
ex-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury who believed that
the illegal practices engaged in by 450 companies were not so prevalent that they could not be
handled by existing law. See Bar Association Report on Questionable Foreign Payments by
Corporations, supra note 46, reprinted in Hearings on HRP13815 and HRP11602, supra note 2, at
90-91; Hearingson HR 3815 and HR 1602, supra note 2, at 235 (statement of U.S. Chamber
of Commerce), at 242-43 (statement of National Assoc. of Manufacturers); Hearingson HR
15481, S.3664, HR_ 13870 and HR 13953, supra note 5, at 83-85 (statement of Gerald L.
Parsky, ex-Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury).

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.64 The Act not only systematized corporate accountability by increasing the reporting requirements imposed upon publicly-held companies, but also prescribed
corporate conduct by prohibiting improper corporate payments to
foreign government officials.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has two main groups of provisions: The accounting provisions, which are contained in Section
102 of the Act, 65 and the antibribery provisions, which are embodied
in Sections 103 and 104 of the Act.6 6
A.

The Accounting Provisions-Section 102

Section 102 amended section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and applies only to those publicly-held U.S. companies
that are required to register with, or report to, the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to the 1934 Act. The accounting
provisions of Section 102 apply to all publicly-held companies, including those that do not engage in foreign business. Section 102
increased the reporting obligations of publicly-held companies by requiring those companies to:
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer;67 and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that 68
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization,
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any differences.
Thus, the accounting provisions created a mechanism by which the
Securities and Exchange Commission could better monitor the internal management of publicly-held companies.
Section 102's accounting provisions do not appear to be relevant
to the problem of improper payments. The Act's legislative history
however, indicates that those provisions, although amendments to
the Securities Exchange Act, were intended to complement the Act's
64. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, Title I, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-l, 78dd-2 (Supp. 1983)).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1983).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I to 2 (Supp. 1983).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1983).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1983).

antibribery provisions by deterring the practice of bribery. 69 Theoretically the requirements imposed by the accounting provisions
would serve to deter the use of corporate funds for improper payments. Companies would be deterred from engaging in these corrupt practices because the maintenance of off-the-book "slush"
funds would be unlawful. The existence of "slush" funds provided
cash for the payment of bribes7" and allowed the use of corporate
funds for improper payments to go undetected by the accounting
and auditing professions."' Thus, the accounting provisions were included to provide adequate internal accounting controls systems to
prevent or at least detect FCPA violations.
Although Congress intended the accounting provisions to complement the antibribery provisions by deterring the practice of bribery, the SEC, which drafted the language of the accounting
provisions,72 had a broader concern in mind. The Commission intended the accounting provisions to serve as a self regulatory measure,73 as a measure for improving corporate accountability. The
Commission viewed the prevalence of bribery as symptomatic of a
broader breakdown in the systen of corporate accountability. Any
breakdown in record-keeping and internal accounting control systems threatens the integrity of the SEC-administered disclosure system,74 which protects investors.
This threat to the disclosure system "irrespective of any bribery
69.
70.

S.REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977).
H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., IstSess. 10(1977). See also SEC REPORT, supra note

24.
71. Some of the pre-FCPA violators had "slush" funds that had gone undetected for as
long as ten years. Interview with Stephen Cooney, National Association of Manufacturers
(Nov. 4, 1981).
72. The SEC made a legislative proposal of the accounting provisions in its May 12, 1976
Report. See SEC REPORT, supra note 24. The 94th Congress adjourned before taking final
action. The Commission's legislative proposals were considered by the 95th Congress, and two
of its four proposals were codified into the accounting provisions of the FCPA in language
almost exactly as written by the SEC. See H.R. REP.No. 831, 95th Cong., istSess. 10 (1977);
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15570 (Feb. 15, 1979). Before the Commission's proposals were adopted by the 95th Congress, but after they had been considered by the 94th Congress, the SEC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in which the SEC announced that it was
considering the promulgation of Section 102's accounting provisions as SEC rules. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 13185 (Jan. 19, 1977). The Commission received approximately 70
comments from the public, and most of those comments expressed opposition to the proposed
SEC rules.
73. Securities and Exchange Commission Memorandum in Response to the U.S. General
Accounting Office's Draft Report on the Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S.
Business reprinted in US.GeneralAccounting Office, Impact ofForeign CorruptPracticesAct on
US.Business 66, 69 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SEC's Memo to GAO].
74. Interview with Securities and Exchange Commission attorney, in Washington, D.C.
(Nov. 3, 1981). See also Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplocation Act: Joint Hearings on S.708 Before the Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance
and Monetary Policy ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 290 (1981) (statement of John Shad, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 708].

or questionable payments," concerned the SEC.7 5 The Commission
thought it crucial "to restore the efficacy of the system of corporate
accountability."7 6 Thus, the Commission's recommendations, i.e.,
Section 102's accounting provisions, were based on the theory that
companies cannot make adequate disclosure of information to investors unless their underlying books and records are accurate.
Violators of the Act's accounting provisions are subject to civil
injunctive actions. Willful violations of those provisions, however,
are criminal offenses and can result in the imposition of the Securities Exchange Act's criminal penalties of a fine of up to $10,000 or
imprisonment for up to five years, or both.77
B.

The Antibribery Provisions -

Sections 103 and 104

Section 10378 amended section 30 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and applies only to those publicly-held U.S. companies
that are required to register with, or report to, the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to the 1934 Exchange Act. Section
104'9 however, is applicable to all other domestic concerns,8 0 even
though they are not subject to SEC regulation.
Both Sections 103 and 104 adopt the criminalization approach
by making it unlawful for an issuer or domestic concern or any officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder acting on behalf of
either an issuer company or a domestic concern to:
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or
offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to -8' (1) any foreign official; 82 or (2) any foreign
political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office;8 3 or (3) any person,8 4 while knowing or having reason
to know that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will
be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign
official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any
candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity,
75. SEC's Memo to GAO, supra note 73, at 70.
76. SEC REPORT, supra note 24.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Supp. 1983).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (Supp. 1983).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (Supp. 1983).
80. Domestic concern is defined as (A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States or which is organized under the laws of a State
of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States. Id
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), - 2(a) (Supp. 1983).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(l), - 2(a)(l) (Supp. 1983).
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(2), - 2(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), - 2(a)(3) (Supp. 1983).

including a decision to fail to perform his or its official functions;
or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official or
candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of
such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer
business for or with, or directing business
in obtaining or8 retaining
5
to any person.
The provision prohibiting the offering or making of payments
or anything of value to "any foreign political party or official thereof
or any candidate for foreign political office" is intended to reach corporate political contributions. Corporate payments to foreign political parties or candidates had greater adverse effects on United
States foreign policy interests than did those bribes that were paid to
obtain or retain a particular contract. Most corporate payments to
foreign political parties or candidates were "undertaken with a view
toward making a long-term investment in a foreign political
' s6
system."
The provision prohibiting the offering or making of payments
or anything of value to "any person while knowing or having reason
to know that all or a portion of such money will be passed on to a
foreign official" is intended to reach those situations where intermediaries, such as foreign agents, are used as conduits to make
payments to foreign officials. Thus, a U.S. company cannot escape
liability for making an improper payment by having an agent make
the payment indirectly, but on its behalf, if the company in fact
knew or had reason to know that its agent would make such a
payment.
Violators of the Act's antibribery provisions are subject to severe penalties. If the violator is an issuer or a domestic concern it
can be fined up to one million dollars."7 If the violator is an individual, he can be fined up to ten thousand dollars and/or imprisoned
not more than five years."' Whenever a fine is imposed upon an
individual, the Act expressly prohibits the issuer or domestic concern
involved to pay the fine, either directly or indirectly. 9
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

IV.

Enforcement responsibilities under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are bifurcated; both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice Department have enforcement responsibilities.
85.

15 U.S.C.

§§ 78ff(a)(1)(A) & (B); (a)(2)(A) & (B); (a)(3)(A) & (B) (Supp. 1982).

86. Hearingson H.R. 3815 & H.R. 1602, supra note 2, at 168 (statement of Hon. Michael
J. Harrington, then Representative from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(1), 78dd-2(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1983).

88.
89.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(2), 78dd-2(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1983).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(4), 78dd-2(b)(4) (Supp. 1983).

The Securities and Exchange Commission has sole enforcement responsibility of Section 102's accounting provisions. In regard to the
antibribery provisions in Section 103, the Commission shares its enforcement responsibility with the Justice Department and is responsible only for civil enforcement of the Section 103 provisions against
publicly-held companies. The SEC therefore must refer all Section
103 criminal prosecutions of issuers to the Justice Department.
The Justice Department is the exclusive enforcer for all criminal
violations of the antibribery provisions. Thus, the Justice Department can initiate criminal prosecutions against issuers under Section
103 as well as against domestic concerns under Section 104. In addition, Section 104 gives the Justice Department civil enforcement responsibilities over domestic concerns.
A.

SEC Cases Involving FCPA Violations

In its enforcement efforts, the SEC has initiated six civil injunctive actions alleging violations of the FCPA. Only one of these
sought to enforce the antibribery provisions.9 0 Perhaps the SEC's
focus on enforcement of the accounting provisions emphasizes the
Commission's original concern for corporate accountability "irrespective of any bribery or questionable payments." 9'
The actions brought by the SEC under the Act can be divided
into two groups.9 2 Included in the first group are those actions, SEC
v. Katy Industries, Inc. , SEC v. Page Airways,94 and SEC v. InternationalSystems and Controls Corporation,95 which not only alleged
violations of Section 102's accounting provisions but also included
allegations of foreign corrupt practices. The second group of cases,
SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp. ,96 SEC v. Wyoming Coal Corp.,9 7
and SEC v. Marlene Industries Corp.,9 8 involved violations of Section 102's accounting provisions, but did not include any allegations
of foreign corrupt practices.
90. The case that alleged a Section 103 violation was SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc., 469
SEC REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-I (N.D. IU. Aug. 30, 1978).
91. For a discussion of the Securities and Exchange Commission's concern for corporate
accountability, see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
92. Comment, Materiality and InternalAccounting Controls Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices.Act, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 931, 946.
93. 469 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-1 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 30, 1978).
94. 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,393 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978);id. 96,717 (D.D.C.
Nov. 18, 1978).
95. 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,922 (D.D.C. July 9, 1979); 97,207 (D.D.C. Dec.
17, 1979).
96. 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,352 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 1978); id 96,458 (D.D.C.
May 24, 1978).
97. Civil Action No. 79-312 (D. Wyo., filed Oct. 15, 1979).
98. 79 Civ. 1959 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 16, 1979).

L Group I Cases.-In SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc. " the SEC
named as defendants Katy Industries, its chairman and another director and charged that they violated Section 102's accounting provisions and Section 103's antibribery provisions. Specifically, those
defendants were charged with violation of Section 103 because they
paid bribes to an Indonesian government official for the purpose of
obtaining a thirty-year contract with Indonesia's state-owned oil and
gas company. In addition, the complaint charged that the defendants were in violation of Section 102 because Katy's books and
records did not reflect accurately and fairly the true nature and purpose of an arrangement between Katy and another corporation. The
other corporation served as the depository agent for the bribes to the
Indonesian government official.
The Katy action resulted in a consent decree, with the district
court issuing a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from
further violations of the FCPA and other securities laws. Katy was
also ordered to establish a Special Committee to review and investigate the allegations in the complaint. The Special Committee was
ordered to issue a report of its findings and recommendations, and
then the Katy Board of Directors was to act upon those
recommendations.
In SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., "o the SEC named as defendants
Page Airways (a world-wide distributor of executive jet aircraft), its
president, its chief financial officer and three other officers and directors and charged them with making payments to foreign government
officials and with violating Section 102's accounting provisions.
Many of the improper payments involved pre-FCPA transactions in
third world countries like the Republic of Gabon, Malaysia, Republic of Ivory Coast, Morocco and Uganda.
In regard to the FCPA violation, it was alleged that between
1975 and 1978 Page Airways sold aircraft and other products, totalling in excess of $15 million, to the Ugandan government. An arrangement had been made whereby one of Page's subsidiaries at the
direction of the Ugandan government, would operate and maintain
the aircraft. The SEC alleged that the operations of Page's subsidiary were not disclosed to Page's shareholders. It also alleged that
Page's subsidiary received substantial amounts of cash from the
Ugandan government for, among other things, expenses incurred in
connection with the subsidiary's operations. The receipts and disbursements of the money received from the Ugandan government,
however, had not been recorded in the books and records of Page
99. 469 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-I (N.D. IH. Aug. 30, 1978).
100. 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,393 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978); id
Nov. 18, 1978).

96,717 (D.D.C.

Airways. The SEC also alleged that Page Airways gave a Cadillac
Eldorado automobile to the Chief of State of Uganda.
This case also resulted in a consent decree; included in that decree were two orders. One order permanently enjoined Page Airways from further violations of the securities laws, and the other
order required Page Airways to correct and amend its annual reports. In addition, a Special Officer was appointed to inquire into
and examine Page's books and records and make a correct accounting to the court and to the SEC.
Most recently, in SEC v. International Systems and Controls
Corp., 10! the SEC brought charges against International Systems
and several of its officers and directors, alleging that bribes totalling
23 million dollars had been paid to foreign persons and entities in a
number of foreign countries for the purpose of obtaining contracts.
In violation of Section 102's internal accounting controls provisions,
International Systems' had disguised those payments, and International Systems books and records did not reflect accurately and
fairly the transactions and dispositions of the company's assets. The
SEC also alleged that International Systems failed to devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions were recorded as necessary to permit the accurate preparation of financial statements.
In December 1979, a consent decree was entered against International Systems and two of the individual defendants. The decree
enjoined these defendants from further violations of the FCPA's accounting provisions and of other securities laws. The company also
was ordered to establish an audit committee which was to amend
International Systems' prior filings and file a new report disclosing
the foreign payments. An unusual facet of the decree was that two
of International Systems' officers, without admitting or denying the
allegations, agreed that they would not work for any other publiclyheld company if that company did not have an audit committee with
duties similar to those of the audit committee that International Systems was ordered to establish.
Even though the above cases involved companies that had all
engaged in foreign corrupt practices, interestingly, the SEC sought
enforcement of Section 103's antibribery provisions in only one of
those cases. In the PageAirways case, it is unclear whether cash payments had been made to Ugandan officials. Page, however, had
given an expensive automobile to an Ugandan official. Perhaps an
argument could be made that the SEC did not seek enforcement of
Section 103 because the value of the bribe was relatively small. This
101. 1979 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Dec. 17, 1979).

96,922 (D.D.C. July 9, 1979); id

97,207 (D.D.C.

argument has little validity, however, when applied to the International Systems case in which it was alleged that approximately 23
million dollars had been paid in foreign bribes. There is no indication why, in those two cases, the SEC chose not to prosecute for the
Section 103 violations. The Commission itself has admitted that,
generally, the antibribery provisions have not been an important
part of its enforcement authority, in part because of the difficulties
02
involved in investigating transactions outside the United States.1
2. Group II Cases.-SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp. 103 was
the first court action brought by the SEC that alleged violations of
the FCPA. Even though the SEC alleged that the defendants had
engaged in improper practices, those practices did not involve any
foreign transactions or foreign officials. Thus, the only FCPA violations were of Section 102's accounting provisions. Aminex and several of its former officers were charged with, inter alia,
misappropriating $1.24 million of corporate funds by means of
fraudulent and improper accounting methods. The defendants consented to entry of judgment and were enjoined from violating Section 102 and other securities laws. Also, ancillary relief was granted
whereby the court appointed a temporary receiver and held the individual defendants liable for the repayment of the $1.24 million.
In SEC v. Wyoming Coal Corp., "o the complaint also alleged
violations of the securities laws, including Section 102's accounting
provisions. In contrast to Aminex, the Wyoming Coal complaint did
not make any reference to improper practices on the part of the defendants. 7he violations simply involved the defendants' failure to
make and keep adequate records and to maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls. On the same date that the complaint was filed, the district court issued a permanent injunction
enjoining the defendants from further violations of the securities
laws.
In SEC v. Marlene Industries Corp. "oI the defendants were engaged in improper practices that did not involve any foreign officials.
In connection with these improper practices, the defendants violated
several sections of the Securities Exchange Act, including Section
102's accounting provisions. This action also resulted in a consent
decree that was entered on the same date that the complaint was
filed. In addition to being permanently enjoined from further viola102. Hearingson S. 708, supra note 74 (statement of John Shad, Chairman, Securities and
Exchange Commission).
103. 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,352 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 1978); id. 96,458 (D.D.C.
May 24, 1978).
104. Civil Action No. 79-312 (D. Wyo., filed Oct. 15, 1979).
105. 79 Civ. 1959 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 16, 1979).

tions of the Securities laws, the defendants were ordered to elect at
least three independent directors. These directors, once elected,
would constitute a majority of the Board of Directors. Marlene also
was ordered to establish an Audit Committee of three directors, two
of which had to be selected from the group of independent directors.
The cases in Group II illustrate that an action for violation of
the FCPA accounting provisions can be successfully maintained independent of the antibribery provisions. Moreover, a Section 102
action can be maintained irrespective of any improper practices.
Some general observations with regard to all the cases can be
made. First, all the SEC cases resulted in consent decrees whereby
the defendants, while neither admitting nor denying the charges in
the SEC's complaints, were issued permanent injunctions enjoining
them from future violations. Although permanent injunctions are
enforceable by criminal contempt proceedings, the effectiveness of
enforcement actions that serve only to admonish conduct that is prohibited by, or that fails to meet the requirements of, the FCPA is
questionable. In addition, in none of the cases were sanctions such
as fines or jail sentences imposed. In fact, in only one case" were
the defendants ordered to make restitution to the corporation for the
amount of the alleged misappropriated funds. Thus, like dogs of a
previous era, corporations under the FCPA apparently are entitled
to one bite.
Second, in all but one of the cases, ancillary relief was a part of
the consent decrees. A temporary receiver, a special officer or an
audit committee was appointed by the court or was ordered to be
established. These special officers or committees were required to
conduct full investigations into the alleged unlawful activities. The
SEC thought that the committees' inquiries served two important
functions: first, because these officers or committees were independent of the management that may have been responsible for the
wrongful conduct, they provided new governance for the corporation
and protection for the shareholders; and second, the investigative reports prepared by these committees were filed with the court to communicate important information concerning past management
0 7
activities to shareholders.
Third, none of the actions brought by the SEC has been apure
FCPA action. All the actions that have alleged violations of the
FCPA provisions have also alleged violations of other securities laws
provisions like the antifraud, reporting and proxy provisions. This
106. SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,352 (D.D.C.
Mar. 9, 1978); id. 96,458 (D.D.C. May 24, 1978).
107. Abuses of CorporatePower: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on PrioritiesandEconomy
in Government ofthe Joint Econonic Co., 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 7 (1976) (statement of Hon.
Roderick M. Hills, then Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).

does not necessarily reflect upon one's ability to maintain a "pure"
FCPA action. Obviously FCPA violations might be coupled with
other securities laws violations because the same facts may give rise
to a violation of both the accounting provisions and other securities
laws designed to eliminate the dissemination of false and misleading
information. The reason put forth by the SEC however, is less obvious: "the Commission, instead places its greatest emphasis on encouraging an environment in which the private sector can meet its
responsibilities in complying with the Act meaningfully and
creatively."' 0 8
Notwithstanding the reason for the SEC choosing not to bring
any "pure" FCPA cases, that very fact raises the following questions.
First, was there really a need for new legislation if, in fact, the SEC
could or would continue to prosecute public companies under preFCPA law? Second, why was the SEC so persistent in its push for
the FCPA accounting provisions?
B. Justice Department Cases Involving FCPA Violations
The Department of Justice has been charged with not being as
active as the SEC in enforcing the FCPA, but such a charge may be
unjust. Although there have been only a few prosecutions for FCPA
violations, the Justice Department has conducted at least eighty-five
investigations" ° into possible FCPA violations. Three investigations
have resulted in prosecutions: one criminal and two civil.
Interestingly, the first action brought by the Justice Department
under the Act, United States v. Carver and Holley, 110 was brought
pursuant to Section 104(c) of the FCPA. Section 104(c) authorizes
the Attorney General to bring a civil action against any domestic
concern or officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder thereof
whenever any of the above is engaged, or is about to engage, in any
act or practice constituting a violation of the Act. In Carver it was
alleged that the defendants Carver, Chairman of the Board and
President of the Holcar Oil Corp., and Holley, the vice president of
the corporation, had engaged and were about to engage in acts and
108. Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress: Impact of Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct on U.S. Business, 66, 72 (1981) (memorandum of Ralph
Ferrara, General Counsel, the Securities and Exchange Commission) quoting address by Harold M. Williams, former SEC Chairman, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: An Analysis, delivered at meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (Jan. 13, 1981).
109. Interview with a Justice Department attorney, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 1981).
One Justice Department official six months earlier in his testimony during the Senate Committee hearings on S.708 indicated that the Department conducted one criminal prosecution,
sought two civil injunctions, initiated twenty investigations which were closed without either
civil or criminal prosecutions and was engaged in thirty-five open investigations, for a total of
fifty-eight investigations. See Hearings on S.708, supra note 74, at 79.
110. 498 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-12 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 1979).

practices which constituted violations of Section 104(a)(1) and (3) of
the FCPA. They had paid 1.5 million dollars to an official of the
government of Qatar, Qatar's Director of Petroleum Affairs. The defendants sought to obtain an oil drilling concession in Qatar, and the
payment of money was to secure the Qataran official's cooperation,
influence and approval of the concession agreement. The government of Qatar did in fact enter into an oil drilling concession agreement with Holcar.
Even though the illegal conduct pre-dated the FCPA, the Department still was able to allege subsequent FCPA violations. The
subsequent violations occurred when the defendants sought to renew
the Holcar Oil Concession. The complaint alleged that the defendants travelled from Florida to Qatar by means of interstate commerce, i e., through airports, "corruptly in furtherance of an offer to
pay something of value to any official of the government of Qatar
who would be willing to use his influence or do an act in his official
capacity in order to secure renewal of the Holcar Oil Concession." '1 '
The Department sought and obtained a final judgment of permanent
injunction restraining and enjoining the defendants from further violations of Section 104's antibribery provisions.
The only other prosecution brought by the Justice Department,
United States v. Kenney InternationalCorp., 12 alleged criminal and
civil violations of the FCPA. Both violations arose out of the same
set of facts. The Department alleged that Finbar B. Kenney, as
Chairman of the Board, President and majority shareholder of Kenney International, "corruptly used an instrumentality of interstate
commerce, i e., Telex communications and a commercial aircraft, in
furtherance of an offer, payment and promise to pay $NZ337.000 to
the Cook Islands Party through Sir Albert Henry, an official of the
party, to induce that party and Henry to affect and influence an act
of the government of the Cook Islands,"' 3 the renewal of a certain
postage stamp distribution agreement between Kenney and the government of the Cook Islands.
For the criminal violation, the Justice Department entered into
a plea agreement that required Kenney International to pay a
criminal fine of fifty thousand dollars. The agreement also required
Finbar Kenney to cooperate with the Cook Islands or New Zealand
prosecutors in a criminal case against him and to make restitution to
the government of the Cook Islands. With regard to the alleged civil
111. Id
112. United States v. Kenney International Corp., 516 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-2
to A-3 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1979).
113. Id

violations, the defendants consented to the entry of a final judgment
permanently restraining and enjoining them from further violations.
Because the actions brought by the Justice Department have
been so few, it is difficult to discern any pattern regarding the Department's enforcement priorities."I4 At least two observations,
however, can be made. First, the prosecutions were brought against
domestic concerns, and thus the Department acted under Section
104 of the Act. The Department has yet to initiate an action against
an issuer under Section 103. Second, in the one criminal action
brought by the Department, a $50,000 fine was imposed upon the
domestic concern. In light of the fact that the domestic concern
could have been fined up to $1 million, the $50,000 amount seems
relatively small. If, however, the $50,000 fine is compared to the
amount of the bribe that was paid ($NZ337.000) then perhaps the
imposed fine is not so small.
V.

Criticisms of the FCPA

A.

General Criticisms

Major criticisms were lodged against the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its effects shortly after passage. It has been argued that
the Act represents an arrogant attempt by the United States to impose extraterritorially American laws and moral beliefs upon foreign
nations.' t' Some critics argued that any unilateral effort by the
United States, or by any other nation for that matter, is the wrong
approach to the problem of bribery," 6 and that the proper and most
effective approach is bilateral and multilateral international agreements. Some obstacles to enforcement of the law would cease to exist' '7 because nations, at least the treaty signatories, no longer would
resent the enforcement of another nation's law, but would cooperate.
Efforts at negotiating such international agreements, however, have
been unsuccessful."' Some believe that an international treaty has
not been negotiated simply because other countries are not interested
in such a treaty.
The United States business community and its supporters have
114. Although the cases brought by the Justice Department are too few to disclose a pattern regarding the Department's enforcement priorities, the Department has made public its
priorities list. For a discussion of the Department's enforcement priorities, see infra notes 18994 and accompanying text.
115. Hearings on S.708, supra note 74, at 195 (statement of Harris Corp. presented by
Joseph R. Creighton, General Counsel).
116. Id at 216 (statement of Norman Pacun, Vice President and General Counsel, Ingersoll-Rand Co.), 552 (statement submitted by American League For Exports and Security
Assistance, Inc.).
117. Comment, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977 4 Solution Or A Problem? 11
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 138 (1981).
118. Hearings on S. 708, supra note 74, at 61 (statement of Ambassador Brock).

been the Act's most vocal critics. They argue that the Act places
U.S. business at a competitive disadvantage to those foreign businesses whose conduct in this regard is not regulated and who therefore continue to make such payments to obtain or retain business." 9
If U.S. businesses have in fact found themselves at a competitive
disadvantage then the resulting effects could be widespread, and
United States exports, balance of payments and employment could
be affected adversely.
The Act's supporters, however, contend that if American businesses are in fact at a competitive disadvantage because they can no
longer bribe foreign officials, then the Act indeed is achieving its
0
goal of eliminating bribery of foreign officials by U.S. companies. 12
In its congressional hearings on the various bills, Congress specifically considered and anticipated the negative result that the Act
would have on U.S. competition and exports. Despite the foreseeable negative impact on U.S. exports, Congress decided that U.S.
companies should be at a competitive disadvantage if their only
means of competing is through the payment of bribes.
More importantly, the business community claims that the Act
causes U.S. businesses to lose export business' 2' by forcing them to
forego legitimate export opportunities. Businessmen argue that the
Act is permeated with ambiguities and is therefore subject to varying
interpretations. They say that, rather than run the risk that their
transactions may later prove to be in violation of the Act, they have
foregone many export opportunities which, in fact, may have been
122
legitimate ones.
Much controversy surrounds the criticism that the FCPA is a
serious export disincentive. On the one hand, supporters of the Act
urge that the criticism simply has no validity. They claim that since
23
the passage of the Act in 1977, the U.S. has seen a major increase'
in exports. Supporters contend that it is impossible to assess quantitatively any negative impact on exports because, even assuming a
decrease in exports, any decrease could be attributed to a number of
other factors which may affect exports. Thus, any business they
would have had but for the FCPA's prohibitions, is merely specula119. Hearings on S708, supra note 74, at 75, 98-105 (Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: Reports from the Foreign Service, Department of State Report). See also Singer, The Crackdown
on Improper Corporate Payments Made Abroad, NAT'L J. 880 (June 3, 1978).
120. Senator Proxmire,supra note 4.
121. The FCPA in fact has become a significant export disincentive. Hearings on S.708,
supra note 74, at 66 (statement of Sherman Unger, Department of Commerce).
122. Id
123. "The dollar value of U.S. exports has increased since 1977, from $121 billion to $221
billion." Senator Proxmire, supra note 4. Senator Proxmire relied on testimony from Mr.
Leddy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who has said that U.S. export performance
in the last few years has been remarkable. See Hearings on S.708, supra note 74, at 63.

tive and such speculation is insufficient evidence to support the
criticism.
The arguments made on the other side of the debate lend some
validity to that criticism. Businessmen respond to the increased exports argument in three ways. First, they argue that the United
States' increase in exports is not an across-the-board increase.
Rather, the increase occurred only in particular areas and did not
affect all export business. Most of these increases have occurred in
areas which have company-to-company trading (e.g., high technology areas) or government-to-government dealing (e.g., agricultural
24
areas). 1
Second, businessmen argue that the alleged increase in U.S. export is based only on one statistic, the surplus figures for the balance
of payments on the current account. 2 5 Admittedly a surplus exists
in that account but businessmen believe that the major reason for the
increase is not improved U.S. economic performance but rather, a
recent change in the accounting methods used to compute those
figures. As a result of that change "the U.S. balance of payments
now includes overseas earnings of U.S. companies reinvested abroad
as a credit entry, and reinvested earnings of foreign companies in the
U.S. as a debit."' 2 6 The effect of the change was to improve the
figures on that account by almost $15 billion in 1979 and by $11
billion in 1980.127 Because of these "inflated" figures, businessmen
believe figures reflecting the balance of trade more accurately measure the U.S. export situation. Figures reflecting the U.S. balance of
trade accounts indicate record deficits since 1977.128
Third, businessmen assert that to state that U.S. exports have
increased is to make a superficial statement which does not negate
the fact that U.S. businesses have lost export sales. They point to the
decrease in share of U.S. participation in world markets from fifteen
percent to twelve percent. 129 Businessmen caution against the use of
dollar figures to measure any growth or increase in exports because
those figures are affected greatly by inflation. They argue that U.S.
exports move up and down in conformity with the relative business
cycle movements and with the value of the dollar. Thus, when the
American business cycle is on the down trend and European and
other foreign business cycles are on the up trend, there is a natural
stimulation in exports. Also, when the U.S. dollar is weak, U.S. ex124. Hearings on S 708, supra note 74, at 63 (statement of Ambassador Brock).
125. Interview with Christine Bliss, Legislative Aide to Senator John Chafee, in Washington, D.C. Nov. 2, 1981).
126. Hearingson S.708, supra note 74, at 595 (letter from Lawrence A. Fox, Vice President
International Economic Affairs of the National Association of Manufacturers).
127. Id
128. The President's Export Council, I THE EXPORT IMPERATIVE 29 (1980).
129. Hearings on S 708,supra note 74, at 62 (statement of Ambassador Brock).

ports are stimulated. Businessmen believe that these trends explain
13
any increase in exports. 1
.

Criticisms of the Accounting Provisions

Critics say that the Act is poorly drafted and point to the lack of
specificity surrounding various terms used in the Act. The accounting provisions contain many terms that illustrate this criticism. For
example, issuers are required to "make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which, in reasonabledetail accurately andfairly reflect the
transactions . . . and devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances."
First, some questions have been raised as to the scope of the
term "issuers."' 3' The definition of issuer, 132 "any person who issues
or proposes to issue any security," does not include or make reference to the word subsidiary, nor do Section 102's accounting provisions. The question raised then is whether foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. companies are also subject to the FCPA regulations, and to
what extent U.S. companies are liable for FCPA violations by their
subsidiaries. The ABA's section of corporation, banking and business law believes that the accounting provisions do not apply to subsidiaries.1 33 Others feel that a subsidiary is regulated by the Act's
accounting provisions if that subsidiary has a material impact on the
financial statements of the reporting company. 134 The SEC does not
limit the applicability of the Act's provisions to those subsidiaries
that have a material impact on the financial statements of the reporting company. According to the SEC, "issuer" is broad enough to
135
encompass all subsidiaries, whether 100% owned or not.
Second, the term "records" is undefined in the accounting provisions and therefore leaves open the question whether it includes all
records required under a company's internal accounting control system or only thosefinancialrecords necessary to the preparation of a
company's financial statements.' 36 The SEC believes that the accounting provisions apply only to records which are related to internal or external audits or to the four internal control objectives
137
contained in the Act.
130. Id
13 1. Legal Times of Washington, April 14, 1980 at 1. Baker & Cheramy, Current Issues
Among Attorneys andAuditors."Accounting Practices Under the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct,

36 Bus. LAW 733, 737 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Accounting Practices].
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (1976).
133. See ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law Guide on the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct (1978); see also Legal Times of Washington, April 14, 1980, at 1.
134. Accounting Practices,supra note 131, at 737.
135. Id See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17500, 46 Fed. Reg. 11544 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Release No. 17500].
136. Legal Times of Washington, April 14, 1980, at 1.
137. SEC Release No, 17500, supra note 135.

Third, other terms which lack specificity are in Section 102's re-

quirement that a company's books and records "in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly" reflect the company's transactions. The legis-

lative history indicates that these terms were not intended to require
meticulousness.1 38 Rather, a company's books and records must be
kept in accordance with accepted accounting methods to reflect its

transactions.
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Fourth, one must go beyond the statute itself for an interpreta-

tion of the term "reasonable assurances," the standard by which a
company's system of internal accounting controls is measured. The
legislative history"4 indicates that this standard is not absolute.
Rather, it includes, among other factors,' 4' a cost/benefit analysis by
which the reasonableness of a company's system of internal accounting controls is determined. The "in reasonable detail" and "reasonable assurances" terms were meant to reflect the objective standards
by which the defendant's conduct was to be measured. Thus the test
is "whether the defendant failed to act as a reasonable and prudent
person would 2 have acted under the same or similar
4
circumstances." 1
The Act also has caused at least two other controversies. The
first relates to the lack of a scienter element. The business community believes that a scienter element should be essential to any SEC
enforcement proceeding under the Act. 143 Without such a requirement, companies fear that they could be held in violation of the Act
even for inadvertent, unintentional errors. Although, the SEC' stated
in its first release on the Act' 44 that all injunctive proceedings under

the Act would be governed by a negligence standard, in a later release it stated that the Act's purpose is to reach knowing or reckless

misconduct and not inadvertent inaccuracies.

45

Although the lan-

138. H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4121, 4122.
139. S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976).
140. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 8 (1977).
141. Id Other factors that must be taken into account are size of the business, diversity of
operations, degree of centralization of financial and operating management, and amount of
control by top management over day-to-day operations.
142. Comptroller General, United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress." Impact of Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct on U.S. Business 66, 84 (1981) (memorandum
from Ralph Ferrara, General Counsel, the Securities and Exchange Commission, in response
to the GAO draft report) [hereinafter cited as GAO Report].
143. Hearings on S 708,supra note 74, at 161 (statement of McNeil, Emergency Comm. of
American Traders). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15570 (Feb. 15, 1979) in
which the SEC said that the comment letters it received indicated that businessmen expressed
a concern about the lack of a scienter element.
144. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-14478 (Feb. 16, 1978).
145. See SEC Release No. 15570 (Feb. 15, 1979) in which the SEC stated its belief that a
concern over the lack of a "scienter" requirement is unwarranted because the legislative history (S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977)) indicated that "standards of reasonableness are to be used."; SEC Release No. 17500, supra note 135. Also, former SEC Chairman
Harold Williams in an address to AICPA on January 13, 1981 in Washington, D.C. said that

guage of the Act does not include the word "scienter," or any other
similar words which would imply a mental element, the Act's legislative history indicates that this issue was not only considered by Congress, but also was dismissed."4 Congress did not intend that proof
of scienter be required, 47 the concern addressed being the resultant
148
harm to the public, not the defendant's state of mind.
The other controversy relates to the lack of a materiality stan-

dard. The FCPA does not contain specifically a materiality standard
by which compliance is to be measured. Because most other federal
securities laws do have a materiality standard, however, some believe that such a standard should be explicitly or implicitly included
149
in the FCPA.

Although it was expected that reporting companies would incur
costs attempting to comply with the accounting provisions, businessmen complain that in the absence of a financial statement materiality standard, compliance becomes burdensome and too expensive. 5 '
The concern is that any false entry, even though it may be of an
insignificant or nominal dollar amount, would always be a violation
of the accounting provisions. Thus, companies attempting to be in
strict compliance with the requirements of the accounting provisions
could find themselves incurring huge compliance costs.' 5'
Some businessmen have estimated that the burdens attributable
to compliance with the accounting provisions have increased their
accounting and auditing costs by eleven to thirty-five percent. 52
Many believe 153 that the interjection of a materiality standard would
destroy the Act because such a standard would provide a means by

which companies, particularly larger ones, could continue with practices the Act was intended to prohibit. For instance, if compliance
with the FCPA's accounting provisions were measured by a materi-

ality standard, companies still could have huge slush funds and not
the principal objective of the FCPA accounting provisions is to prevent knowing or reckless
conduct.
146. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
147. Id
148. But see supra note 33.
149. The original Chafee bill, S.2763, sought to amend the accounting sections of the
FCPA by, inter alia, including a materiality test that was related to generally accepted accounting principles. See Comment, Materialityand InternalAccounting Controls Under the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 931, 951.
150. Hearingson S.708, supra note 74, at 141 (statement of McNeil, Emergency Committee of American Traders).
151. SEC Release No. 15570 (Feb. 15, 1979).
152. GAO Report, supra note 142. See also Hearingson S. 708, supra note 74, at 102 (Dept.
of State FCPA Foreign Service Reports) which states, "The Embassy in Caracas reported that
estimates of increases in accounting costs run as high as 30% and that such increased costs
clearly reduce the ability of U.S. companies to compete for contracts."
153. Senator William Proxmire and former head of the SEC Harold Williams are two
who oppose a materiality standard. See U.S. Business Overseas: Back to Bribery? The Wall
St. J., April 30, 1981, at 26, col. 3.

be in violation of the Act because the amount of money in the funds
may not be material to those companies' financial statements and
balance sheets. Arguably, if compliance were measured by a materiality standard and the payments that were made during the 1970's
were made today, the involved companies would not be in violation
of the Act 4because not one of these payments would be considered
15
material.
C. Criticisms of the Antibribery Provisions
The antibribery provisions are the most widely criticized provisions of the FCPA, perhaps because a violation of the antibribery
provisions would blemish a corporation's reputation more than a violation of the accounting provisions. Further, a violation of the antibribery provisions could result in the direct imposition of criminal
penalties.
The FCPA provides that any company which violates the antibribery provisions can be fined up to one million dollars.1 55 In addition, any stockholder acting on behalf of such company, or any
employee or agent of such company, who willfully carried out the
act or practice constituting such violation can be fined up to ten
thousand dollars, imprisoned up to five years or both.. 56 Many people have argued that the penalties are much too severe.' 57 Any examination of the Justice Department's enforcement cases, however,
would reveal that the stiff penalties that canpossibly be imposed for
violations of the antibribery provisions should be of least concern to
58
the business community.1
The Act also provides that whenever a fine is imposed upon any
of the above-mentioned individuals, the fine cannot be paid, directly
or indirectly, by that individual's company. 59 Some objections to
this provision have also been raised. This provision, however, seems
to be in accord with a basic principle of agency law that "an agent
employed to conduct a transaction which he knows to be illegal (although authorized) can no more recover indemnity than he can
compensation." 160
Many have criticized the criminalization approach taken in the
antibribery provisions because such an approach creates not only enforcement problems, but also potential foreign relations problems as
154. Id.
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. 1983).
156. Id
157. McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Payments By Corporations:
A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 FORDHAm L. RaV. 1071, 1073 (1978).
158. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
159. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I, 78dd-2 (Supp. 1983).
160. W. SEAVEY, AGENCY 266, 270 (1964).

well. 6 ' One faces enforcement problems when it is difficult, if not
impossible, to obtain the evidence necessary to establish the elements
of the crime to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. It may be difficult to obtain evidence for FCPA prosecutions
because, in most instances, the cooperation of a foreign country may
be essential. It may be particularly difficult to obtain evidence in
those instances in which a foreign official is involved in the alleged
act or practice constituting a violation of the Act, or in which the
alleged act or practice occurred in a foreign country. No country is
compelled to provide judicial assistance in criminal matters of another country. 62 Therefore, if a foreign country is either unable or
unwilling to cooperate and assist U.S. enforcement agencies in their
efforts to prosecute violations of the Act, the criminal prosecutions
may have to be aborted.
Others believe that any attempt to enforce the antibribery provisions may also lead to foreign relations problems.1 63 The argument
here is that, ipso jure, any prosecution for violations of the antibribery provisions would necessarily implicate a foreign official,
who then would be left to suffer the adverse consequences that may
follow certain allegations. If a foreign official has been wrongly accused of accepting a bribe, his reputation is forever tainted and such
accusations may generate foreign relations problems for the United
States.
Criticism has also been directed at the language used in the antibribery provisions. The Act makes it unlawful for any issuer, domestic concern or any officer, director, employee, agent or
stockholder of any issuer or domestic concern to corruptly offer, pay,
promise to pay or authorize payment of money or the giving of anything of value to anyforeign official, foreign political party or any
person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a portion
of such money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised to
any foreign official for purposes of influencing any act or decision of
such foreign official or party to use his or its official capacity, or inducing such foreign official or party to use his or its influences to
affect or influence any act or decision of such government in order to
assist such issuer or domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.' 64 The terms
and phrases that have been subjected to the most criticism are: "cor161. Hearingson S. 708, supra note 74 at 271 (statement of Mark Feldman, former Deputy
Legal Advisor to the Department of State). Lashbrooke, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977. A UnilateralSolution To An InternationalProblem, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 227, 239-40
(1979) [hereinafter cited as.A UnilateralSolution].
162. Note, ProhibitingForeign Bribes.- CriminalSanctionsforCorporatePaymentsAbroad,
10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 248 (1977).
163. A4 UnilateralSolution, supra note 161, at 234-35.
164. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. 1983).

ruptly,.... foreign official (ministerial or clerical)," and "reason to
know."
1. Corruptly.-Arguments have been made that since the Act's
passage, businessmen are no longer able to incur business expenses
for the entertainment of, or gifts to, foreign officials.65 The incurring of such expenses are often considered necessary to conduct business in some foreign countries, to establish or promote goodwill. It
has been argued that businessmen have been refraining from, or at
least have been cautious about, incurring such expenses because they
fear that these actions may fall within the Act's prohibition on corrupt practices. 66
Supporters of the Act believe that such a criticism is without
any validity whatsoever.' 67 To establish a violation of the Act, it
must be shown that the violator acted with the necessary mental intent "corruptly" to influence or induce the foreign official. Although
the term "corruptly" is not defined in the Act itself, the legislative
history is supportive of the argument made by the Act's supporters.
Both the Senate and House Reports indicate that "the word 'corruptly' connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully
influence the recipient."'' 68 Unless one has this requisite intent, he
need not be concerned about incurring routine expenses for business
gifts and entertainment.
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2. Foreign Official (Ministerialor Clerical).-The

antibribery

provisions focus not only on the purpose of the payment but also on
the recipient of the payment. The term "foreign official" is defined
in the Act to include "any officer or employee of a foreign government. . . or any person acting in an official capacity for or on be... 170 The definition also states that the
half of such government.

term "foreign official" "does not include any employee of a foreign
government . . . whose duties are essentially ministerial or cleri-

nor is an
cal."'' No definition of "ministerial or clerical" is given
72
explanation of which employees perform such duties.'
165. Hearingson S. 708, supra note 74, at 153-54 (statement of McNeil, Emergency Committee of American Traders).
166. Id at 103 (Dept. of State Reports from The Foreign Service).
167. Sen. Proxmire, supra note 4.
168. See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4098, 4108, 6306, 6316; H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
169. Id See also Sprow & Benedict, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977: Some
PracticalProblems and Suggested Procedures I CORP. L. REV. 357, 360 (1978).
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. 1983).
171. Id
172. Hearings on S, 708, supra note 74, at 151 (statement of McNeil, Emergency Committee of Ameican Traders); Georges, The Foreign Corrupt PracticerAct Review Procedure: A
Quest For Clarity, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 57, 59 (1981) [hereinafter cited as A Quest for
Clarity].

The Act and its legislative history are unhelpful. It can be discerned, however, that employees with essentially ministerial or clerical duties were excluded from the definition of foreign official to
exempt so-called "grease" or "facilitating" payments from the Act's
prohibitions.'7 3 These payments are made to low-level government
employees to get them to do what they are supposed to do anyway,
but perhaps in a more timely or more careful manner.' 74 If Congress
has exempted "grease" or "facilitating" payments from the Act's
coverage, then such exemptions should be clearly stated, and their
parameters clearly defined.
3. Reason to Know. -The phrase that has generated the most
criticism is contained in the provision prohibiting payments to "any
person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a portion
of such money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised to
any foreign official . . ...
"
Nowhere in the Act or its legislative
history is the phrase defined. The phrase was included for the purpose of reaching those U.S. companies that used foreign intermediaries as conduits for bribing foreign officials.
Many people believe that the reason to know standard is inappropriate for a number of reasons. 76 First, there is no similar standard in the domestic bribery laws. 177 Second, it is believed to be too
harsh of a standard because it holds U.S. companies liable for the
illegal acts of their agents. Companies argue that it is culturally and
commercially difficult to be a watchdog over or to control the behavior of agents, particularly when the agents are foreign nationals sta178
tioned in foreign countries.
Further, the standard is thought to be inappropriate because
even though companies are liable for the illegal payments made by
their agents, no guidance is given as to the extent to which companies should go in their investigations of the backgrounds of agents.
Nor is any guidance given as to protective measures that companies
could undertake to insure that their agents will not violate the
FCPA. Some companies have attempted to initiate protective measures like having agents sign affidavits which state that they have
173. H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) reprinted in 186 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) N-6 to N-7 (Dec. 13, 1977) (statement of Senator Tower on the floor of the Senate prior
to passage), cited in A Questfor Clarity, supra note 172, at 59 n. 12; S.REP. No. 114, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1977).
174. Examples are customs agents or other such employees who expedite forms, permits
and licenses.
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (Supp. 1983).
176. Hearings on S.708, supra note 74, at 41 (statement of Ambassador Brock), 140 (statement of McNeil, Emergency Committee of American Traders), 390 (statement of Robert Graham, Governor of Florida, on behalf of National Governors' Association).
177. Id at 41 (statement of Ambassador Brock).
178. In many cases the local law in a foreign country may require a company to engage
local representatives to serve as the company's agent for purposes of doing business.

been instructed on the prohibitions of the FCPA and that they will
not engage inany of the prohibited conduct. 7 9
Companies have run into problems, however, by attempting
such precautionary measures. One problem is that affiants take offense to such measures. Affiants feel insulted because such measures
carry with them implications that, absent such an affidavit, the affiants would, or might, engage in improper practices.' 80 Another
problem is that even after having taken such precautionary measures, companies are not assured that such measures will relieve them
instances in which the affiant still proceeds to
of liability in those
8
violate the Act. '
Businessmen have argued that the "reason to know" standard
has caused them to lose business opportunities. Some legitimate
business opportunities have been lost because, rather than run the
risk of being held liable for the illegal acts of their agents, some com82
panies have foregone opportunities in certain countries altogether.'
Supporters of the "reason to know" standard acknowledge that
it is strict, but argue that it is the only effective standard. A reason to
know standard ensures some in-house enforcement of the Act by
forcing companies to take some responsibility to assure themselves
that their employees and agents are complying with the Act's provisions. "Removing the 'reason to know' clause would really carve the
core out of the antibribery portion of the FCPA."'' 3
VI.

The Government's Response

A.

The President's Task Force on Export Disincentives

Not long after the enactment of the FCPA, the government responded to businessmen's complaints.' 8 4 In 1978, President Carter's
interagency Task Force on Export Disincentives studied, inter alia,
179.

Interview with William Maroni, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, in Washington,

D.C. (Nov. 4, 1981).
180. Id See also Hearings on S.708, supra note 74, at 105 (Dept. of State Reports from the

Foreign Service).
181. See U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure
Release No. 80-03 (Oct. 29, 1980).
182. See President Carter's Report to the Congress on Export Promotion Functions and

Potential Export Discentives. See also Hearingson S.708, supra note 74, at 102 (Dept. of State
Reports from the Foreign Service). The regions thought to pose the greater risks are: the
Middle East, South America, Africa and Southeast Asia. Thus, virtually the "entire world
outside of Socialist countries and Western Europe is a sensitive region." Stephen Cooney,
Director of International Investment, National Association of Manufacturers, interviewed in
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 4, 1981). See also A Questfor Clarity, supra note 172, at 63 n.19.

183. Senate To Begin Debate On Administration'sPlan to Ease Rules Against Paying Bribes
Overseas, The Wall St. J., May 20, 1981 (quoting Stephen Friedman, former SEC
Commissioner).
184. The Commerce and State Departments recommended that the business community
be provided with guidelines. The Justice Department and the Securities Exchange Commission opposed the idea of providing any kind of guidance.

the FCPA and its effect on U.S. business activities overseas. The
Task Force concluded that a substantial amount of foreign business
was being lost because of uncertainties surrounding the application
of the Act.' 85 The Task Force confirmed and documented many of
the business community's complaints. The Task Force recommended that the Justice Department provide the business community with some guidance on the FCPA to eliminate unintended or
unwarranted obstacles to export sales.
The Commerce and State Departments also recommended that
the Justice Department provide some guidance to the business community. The Justice Department unequivocally opposed such recommendations. The Justice Department argued that it was not for it
to tell companies how far the companies can go without risking prosecution and that any ambiguities could and should be resolved by
means of judicial interpretation.' 86 Adopting the Task Force's recommendations, President Carter announced on September 26, 1978
that he was directing the Justice Department to provide guidance to
the business community concerning the Department's enforcement
87
priorities under the Act.'
The Justice Department reluctantly undertook the President's
directive and began considering various means by which that directive could be met. The Department considered a number of alternative approaches to arrive at the most effective means by which it
88
could provide guidance for the business community.'
The Justice Department decided that a statement of the Department's enforcement priorities and a case-by-case review procedure
could provide meaningful guidance to the business community, and
on November 8, 1979, Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann indicated the types of cases the Justice Department would
consider the most urgent and egregious.' 89 Heymann listed those situations that the Department would consider to be of the highest priority and emphasized that the major criteria governing enforcement
for any violation would be the accessibility to, and strength of, the
185.

See, e.g., 1 THE PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, THE EXPORT IMPERATIVE: REPORT
90 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT].
Statement of the President on United States National Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY
OF PRES. DocS. 1631, 1633-34 (1978).
Interview with a Justice Department attorney in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 1981).
See SHINE & MENDELSON, THE NEW REVIEW PROCEDURE UNDER THE FOREIGN

TO THE PRESIDENT

186.
COMP.
187.
188.

CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 458, 463 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The New Review Procedure].
See also Georges, A Questfor Clarity,supra note 172, at 57-66 (for a discussion of the pros and
cons of the alternative approaches).
189. The statements were made in a speech, entitled "The Justice Department's Proposed
Program to Provide Advice to Businesses in Connection with Foreign Payments," given by
Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, on Nov. 8, 1979 at the Pierre Hotel in New York City [hereinafter cited as Heymann's
Speech].

needed evidence." 9 The "highest priority" list included: situations
in which bribes are being paid in markets where the only competitors are other American companies;1 9 1 situations in which there are
both American and foreign competitors, but only the American companies are engaging in bribery; 9 2 and situations in which American
companies have bribed foreign officials and those officials are being
prosecuted by their nations for receipt of those bribes.193 Other relevant factors that the Justice Department would consider in choosing
its priority cases include the level of the foreign official being bribed;
the size of the payment; the size of the economic transaction which
the payment affects; any past or persistent conduct of the violator;
any involvement of the American company's senior management official; and, where a lower level employee is involved, the diligence
with which the company monitors the activities of such employees. t94 Further guidance would be provided through a case-by-case
review procedure.
B.

The Department of Justice's FCPA Review Procedure

1. The Purpose of the Procedure.-On March 20, 1980, Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti signed regulations establishing
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure in the Department of Justice. 95 The Review Procedure, modeled after the Business Review Procedure administered by the Department's Antitrust
Division,196 was another means by which the Justice Department attempted to respond to the President's directive. 97
190. Id
191. In an earlier part of the speech Heymann cited the pre-Act Lockheed case as such an
example
Corrupt practices %ere committed by Lockheed in Japan in an attempt to win a contract for wide-bodied jets against two other American manufacturers. In such a market there is no one-sided burden from a law that requires competition on the merits.
To the contrary, without such a law, each time an American company makes an illicit
payment, there is created a one-sided incentive for its American competitors to follow
suit in a race to the bottom.
Id
192. This situation probably would support the argument made by then-Secretary of the
Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal in his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee that
"paying bribes... is simply not necessary for the successful conduct of business here or overseas." Hearingson H.R. 3815 andH 1602, supra note 2 (statement W. Michael Blumenthal).
193. In this situation the Department would be making efforts to coordinate and cooperate
with other nations' efforts to "clean up the competitive arena." Heymann's Speech, supra note
189. Heymann also indicated that the Department then had "executive agreements for mutual
assistance in criminal matters with 25 nations, which [agreements] provided for conditional
exchanges of information about specified companies between the cooperating prosecutors" and
expressed anticipation that the number of nations would continue to grow.
194. Id.
195. Dept. of Justice Order No. 878-80, Establishing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Review Procedure, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980) (codified at 28 C.F.R. 50.18 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as 28 C.F.R. 50.18].
196. Dept. of Justice Release, March 24, 1980 at 3; Heymann's Speech, supra note 189.
See also Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. 50.6(9) (1983).
197. Heymann's Speech, supra note 189. See also Request for Comments on the Depart-

The guidance provided is limited because a party cannot make
use of the Review Procedure for matters relating to Section 102's

accounting provisions,"' perhaps for two reasons. First, the Review
Procedure is administered by the Justice Department which does not

have any enforcement responsibility for the accounting provisions.
That responsibility lies solely with the SEC. Second, although the
SEC was invited to participate in reviewing transactions under the
FCPA Review procedure, the Commission declined to join the Justice Department in the administration of the Review Procedure.1 99
The FCPA Review Procedure is available for the consideration
of matters relevant to Sections 103 and 104's antibribery provisions.

Thus, any party concerned that a prospective transaction may possibly violate the FCPA's antibribery provisions may request a Justice
Department 2°° review of the transaction and a statement of the Department's present enforcement intention if the party should proceed

with the proposed transaction.2° '

The Justice Department has much discretion in the administration of the Review Procedure. First, the Department may refuse to
even consider a review request.2 °2 Second, if the Department does
decide to review a request, after such review it has three options:
(1) it may state its present enforcement intention with respect to the

proposed business conduct; (2) it may decline to state its present enforcement intention; or (3) it may take such other position or action
as it considers appropriate.2 °3
The party or parties that submitted the request may rely upon
the Department's review letter once issued. 2° Therefore, if the De-

partment approves a particular transaction, and the disclosure of information relevant to the proposed conduct was accurate and
ment of Justice's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure, 46 Fed. Reg. 9064 (1981)
(hereinafter cited as 46 Fed. Reg. 9064].
198. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(m), supra note 195.
199. See Securities Exchange Act Release NO. 34-17099, Statement of Commission Policy
Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001 (1980)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. 241.17099) [hereinafter cited as SEC Release No. 34-170991; Heymann's
Speech, supra note 189. Not only is the Review Procedure unavailable to those with questions
regarding the application of the accounting provisions, but the regulations establishing the
Review Procedure also state that "[nleither the submission of a request for an FCPA review, its
pendency, nor the issuance of an FCPA review letter, shall in any way alter the responsibility
of the party or parties to comply with the accounting requirements of Section 102 of the
[FCPAJ." 28 C.F.R. 50.18(m), supra note 195.
200. The FCPA Review Procedure is administered by the Multinational Fraud Branch of
the Criminal Division's Fraud Section.
201. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(n), supra note 195.
202. Id. at 50.18(d).
203. Id. at 50.18(h). The regulations also provide that the Department's failure to take
action after receipt of a review request, documents or information shall not limit or stop the
Department from taking any action at such time thereafter as it deems appropriate. Id at
50.18(p).
204. A review letter has no application to any party which does not join in the request
therefor. Id at 50.18(e).

complete when originally submitted, and such information continues

to be an accurate and complete reflection of the circumstances,2 °5
then the requesting party need not fear any subsequent civil or criminal enforcement action by the Department under the Sections 103

or 104.20

6

The Review Procedure was established not only to provide direct and specific guidance in response to individual requests, but also
to provide indirect and general guidance to the business community
at large. Each review request is made public by the issuance of a
release, generally describing the nature of the transaction and the
Department's enforcement decision.20 7 It was hoped that the re-

leases, over time, would disclose a pattern of the Department's interpretations and perspectives. 208 It is unclear whether this design of
the Review Procedure has been effectuated.
2. The Department's Review Releases.-Since the establishment of the FCPA Review Procedure in March, 1980, the Justice
Department has received only a few review requests. 2 0 9 The Department published its first four releases on October 29, 1980.210 Some
205. Id at 50.18(0.
206. An FCPA review letter will not bind or obligate any other agency. Id at 50.18(1).
Thus, for example, the SEC could initiate a civil enforcement action against issuers under
Section 103. However, the SEC has stated as follows:
[Als a matter of prosecutorial discretion, it will take no enforcement action alleging
violations of Section 30A with respect to a transaction in any case where an issuer has
sought and obtained a letter from the Department as part of the Review Procedure,
prior to May 31, 1981, which the Department will not take enforcement action under
Section 30A with respect to the transaction. SEC Release No. 34-17099, supra note
199.
207. Department of Justice Release, Mar. 24, 1980 at 3.
208. Heymann's Speech, supra note 189.
209. The Department has received five review requests, but only four review releases have
been published. See 46 Fed. Reg. 9064 (1981), supra note 197.
210. In U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 80-01 (Oct. 29, 1980),
an American law firm souqht the Department's review of its proposal to establish a $10,000
fund in a foreign country for the education and support of two adopted children of one of that
government's honorary officials. The Department was satisfied that the law firm would not
receive any preferential treatment in return for the proposed conduct. The official's duties did
not involve substantive decision making responsibilities, and the children's natural parents,
although employees of the foreign government, were not in positions "to make or to influence
official decisions that would in any way benefit either the law firm or any corporations which
may contribute to the education fund, in their dealings with the foreign government." With
respect to the proposed conduct, the Department stated that it did not intend to take any
enforcement action.
In U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 80-02 (October 29, 1980),
Castle & Cooke, Inc. requesied a review of the prospective conduct of an employee of one of
its subsidiaries located in a foreign country. The employee wanted to seek election to a parttime legislative position with the foreign government while retaining his employment with the
corporation. If permitted to do so, the employee would "fully disclose his continuing relationship with the corporation to his political party, the electorate and to the government, and
refrain from participation in any legislative matters or other governmental action which would
directly affect the corporation." The Department told Castle & Cooke, Inc. that it did not
intend to take any enforcement action with respect to the employee's proposed conduct.
In U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 80-03 (Oct. 29, 1980), the
Department exercised its option under 28 C.F.R. 50.18(h) to decline to state its present en-

general conclusions can be drawn from the four releases. First, in all
three releases in which the Department stated its enforcement intention, the Department's decisions were favorable to the requesting

party. 21 I The Department's favorable decisions are noteworthy for
the following reasons: They were foreseeable; they limit the scope of

the guidance provided to the business community; and they serve to
weaken much of the business community's criticisms about the
FCPA.
It is expected, or at least understandable, that companies would
be selective about which transactions would be submitted for Justice
Department review. Thus, if the only transactions being submitted
for review are those that the companies are almost certain would be
acceptable, then it is foreseeable that the Department's response
would be favorable.
The purpose of the Review Procedure is to provide guidance to
the business community to alleviate some of the business commu-

nity's concerns about the application of the FCPA. The scope of that
guidance is limited, however, when the only thing that can be disforcement intentions. In that request, a U.S. domestic concern that wanted to do business with
an attorney practicing in West Africa submitted for review a proposed contract between the
parties. Although the proposed contract made two references to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, the contract "did not reflect any facts or circumstances which could reasonably cause
concern about the application or possible violation of the Act."
The Department therefore sought additional facts and circumstances concerning the attorney's background and qualifications as well as the attorney's government connections, his relationship with the U.S. company, the nature of the African business, particular performance
expectations and pending projects of special interest in Africa. Under 28 C.F.R. 50.18(g)
(1983) the Department can request additional information it considers necessary to review a
matter. Even this more extensive review did not raise any reasonable concern about the
FCPA, so the Department refused to respond to the review request.
Release No. 80-03, however, provides some useful guidance. One of the provisions in the
proposed contract used language similar to that contained in the FCPA to prohibit the attorney from making payments to foreign officials. Perhaps the insertion of this provision was an
attempt by the domestic concern to insulate itself from criminal liability for having reason to
know that all or a portion of a payment made to the attorney would be passed on to a foreign
official. If this was a concern to the company, the Department made it clear that "a mere
contract provision, without other affirmative precautionary steps, would not be sufficient."
The Department did not, however, give any indication of "affirmative precautionary steps"
that could be taken.
In U.S. Dept. of Justice, FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 80-04 (October 29, 1980)
the Department received a joint review request from the Lockheed Corporation and the
Olayan Group, a Saudi Arabian diversified trading, services and investment organization.
The two corporations wanted to enter into certain agreemenrs with each other for the purpose
of doing business with the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and with the Saudi
Arabian Airlines Corporation (Saudia). The parties were concerned about their prospective
conduct because the Chairman of the Olayan Group, Mr. Suliman S. Olayan, was also an
outside director of Saudia.
If the two corporations were to enter into a business relationship, Mr. Olayan would:
(1) disclose the fact of that relationship to the Saudia Board of Directors; (2) abstain from
voting with respect to any matters concerning Lockheed which may come before the board;
and (3) refrain from using his position, on behalf of Lockheed, to influence any government
official. Based on these facts and circumstances the Department decided not to take any enforcement action.
211. FCPA Review Procedure Release Nos. 80-01, 80-02 & 80-04 (Oct. 29, 1980).

cerned from the Review Releases is what business conduct and
transactions would be acceptable or permissible. The business community has yet to receive a Review Release example of conduct or
transactions that would be impermissible under the FCPA. Thus,
the business community still has some anxiety and uncertainty about
the application of the Act.
It has been argued that the FCPA is ambiguous in its language
and that the ambiguities have generated uncertainty about the Act's
application, which has had a chilling effect on U.S. companies competing overseas. If the transactions submitted for Justice Department review were in fact perceived by the requesting companies to
be actual causes for reasonable concern, however, then perhaps the
Department's favorable reviews indicate that the FCPA is not as restrictive of business conduct as many in the business community perceive it to be.
Some conclusions also can be drawn about the quantity and
type of information disclosed in the Review Releases. For example,
although one release2" 2 specifically identified the review requestors,
the names of the foreign government and foreign corporation involved, and other information, the requests of at least three of the
four parties for nondisclosure of either all or part of their information were honored. In the only release that seems to have been completely exempt from the Freedom of Information Act,213 the
Department did not publish any identifying information at all.
There was partial nondisclosure in two other releases.2" 4 In
2
one, 15 the name of the U.S. company and the foreign government
position that the company's employee sought to influence were disclosed. The name of the foreign country involved, however, was not
disclosed. In the other release,21 6 the information that was not disclosed was the exact opposite. The name of the foreign country was
disclosed, while the name of the requesting U.S. company was not.
3. Criticisms of the Review Procedure.-When the September
1980 report on export disincentives stated that businessmen did not
2 17
think that the Review Procedure would prove to be very useful,
President Carter ordered the Justice and Commerce Departments to
report to him their assessment of the FCPA Review Procedure's effectiveness during its first year of operation.21 8 In their efforts to
212. FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 80-04 (Oct. 29,
213. FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 80-01 (Oct. 29,
214. FCPA Review Procedure Release Nos. 80-02 & 80-03
215. FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 80-02 (Oct. 29,
216. FCPA Review Procedure Release No. 80-02 (Oct. 29,
217.

1980).
1980).
(Oct. 29, 1980).
1980).
1980).

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 185, at 92.

218. The directive was given in the President's Report to the Congress on Export Promotion Functions and Potential Export Disincentives (September 1980).

make that assessment, the Departments sought comments from the
public on the effectiveness and usefulness of the Review Procedure
in reducing uncertainties about the meaning of the antibribery provisions of the Act.2 19
Although the efforts made by the Justice Department in establishing the Review Procedure are viewed as desirable, the consensus
reflected by the comments is that the Review Procedure does not
reduce the uncertainties and adverse effects of the Act.2 20 The Review Procedure is believed to be plagued by the following problems:
(i) Burdensome requirements for requesting review; Department's
discretion to refuse a review request; and, timing of the response;
(ii) review letter's nonbinding effect on other agencies;
(iii) Department's statement of present intentions only and only as to
FCPA provisions; and (iv) lack of confidentiality.
(a) Burdensome requirements for requesting review; Department's discretion to refuse a review request,- and timing of the response.-When making a request for a review a party is required to
submit a request that is specific and that contains in detail all relevant and material information bearing on the conduct for which review is requested and on the circumstances of the proposed
" ' In addition, requesting parties
conduct.22
must provide the Department with any additional information or documents that the Department may thereafter request to review a matter.22 2 Another
prerequisite to the filing of a review request is the requirement that a
senior corporate officer with operational responsibility for the conduct which is the subject of the review request certify the veracity of
the disclosed details.2 23 Many people find these requirements to be
stringent and much too burdensome.2 2 4
Some members of the legal community, representing a diverse
group of American multinational corporations, have asserted that
the requirement that a review request be certified by a senior officer
219. See 46 Fed. Reg. 9064, supra note 197. While all comments would be considered,
only those comments received before February 16, 1981 were assured consideration in the
preparation of the Department's report to the President. The Report was never made. By
agreement of the Departments and the concurrence of the White House, the report was held in
abeyance so the Departments could respond to the congressional hearings on S.708. Interview
with a Justice Department attorney in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 1981).
220. See GAO Report, supra note 142; FCPA comment letter from ITT; FCPA comment
letter from the National Foreign Trade Council; Hearings on S. 708, supra note 74, at 205
(statement of Joseph R. Creighton, Harris Corp.), 220-21 (statement of Norman Pacun, Ingersoll-Rand Corp.).
221. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(f), supra note 195.
222. Id at 50.18(g).
223. Id at 50.18(f).
224. See FCPA comment letter from the Association of General Contractors; FCPA comment letter from the Rule of Law Committee.

makes the Review Procedure unnecessarily difficult to implement.2 25
They argue that corporate controllers and general counsel should be
permitted to certify the accuracy of the request, particularly because
these corporate officials usually are most familiar with overseas
transactions. 226 The Administrators of the Review Procedure do not
believe that this criticism is valid. Instead, they have stated that corporate controllers or general counsel rarely have sufficient responsibility for the corporate conduct to certify the accuracy of a
request.2 27 Further, the Department is convinced of the importance
of having officers with operational responsibility for the conduct
fully cognizant of the facts which are causes for concern and are
thereby generating the request for review.
In attempting to comply with the requirements, a party conceivably may have to prepare voluminous documents to give the Justice
Department a full, authenticated factual background on the proposed conduct. Some have argued that unless the proposed transaction is large enough, in monetary terms, the time and costs necessary
to prepare a request are not justified.2 2 Even if a party decides that
the transaction is worth the time and expense necessary to meet the
requirements for the submission of a review request, he is not sure a
review will be made.22 9 This is troublesome to businessmen, 230 particularly because sensitive or confidential facts would already have
been disclosed and subjected to Department scrutiny. The Department's discretion not to review a case deters the business community's use of the Review Procedure.
23 1
Another criticism voiced by many in the business community
relates to the timing of the Department's response to a review request. The regulations provide that the Department will make
"every reasonable effort to respond to any review request within 30
days after receipt of the review request and of any requested additional information and documents. ' 232 Without any assurances that
225. See FCPA comment letter from the Rule of Law Committee. The counsel participating in that comment did so while representing the following companies: Atlantic Richfield
Co., Bank of America, Bechtel Inc., Bethlehem Steel Corp., Chase Manhattan Bank, Exxon
Corp., General Electric Co., Gulf Oil Corp., Standard Oil Co. of California, and Texaco Inc.
226. Id
227. See FCPA response letter from Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General U.S.
Department of Justice, to the Rule of Law Committee.
228. Interview with a government attorney at a major federal agency.
229. After a review request has been submitted, the Department in its discretion may refuse to consider the review request or "decline to state its present enforcement intentions." 28
C.F.R. 50.18(d), (h), supra note 195.
230. See FCPA comment letter from the Association of General Contractors; FCPA comment letter from ITT.
231. See FCPA comment letters from the National Foreign Trade Council, the Association of General Contractors, and Breed, Abbott and Morgan; see also Atchinson, The Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct -A PracticalLook, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 342, 345 (1981) (hereinafter cited
as A PracticalLook].
232. 28 C.F.R. 50.18, supra note 195.

a review will be completed quickly, some businessmen fear that the
thirty day period of time often could prove fatal to the proposal
under consideration. The Department's decision on the proposed
transaction could be moot by the time the decision is rendered. This
possibility is particularly enhanced when the Department needs and
requests additional information or documents. Issuance of a review
letter then could be postponed even beyond the thirty day period.
The thirty day provision may not be unreasonable, however,
since the provision does not state that thirty days is the minimum
period of time the Department has to review a request, but rather is
the maximum.2 3 3 This time period affords the Department a reasonable opportunity to review the request and to consider carefully the
information presented and the consequences thereof. Having
enough time for a careful review of each request is not only beneficial to the reviewers, but is in the best interests of the requestors as
well. Further, a requesting party may indicate in the review request
any time constraints with which he may be faced, for possible consideration by the Department.2 34
(b) Review letter's nonbinding effect on other agencies.-- One of
the greatest concerns expressed in some of the public comment letters 235 is that an FCPA review letter will not bind or obligate any
other agency,23 6 such as the SEC. Thus, an issuer who has made a
request for review and who has received a favorable review letter
from the Justice Department remains uncertain whether he can be
prosecuted by another agency for the very conduct for which he
sought review.
In the early consideration of the Review Procedure, the Department invited the Securities and Exchange Commission to join in the
reviewing of transactions under the Review Procedure. The Commission declined the invitation.23 7 In making the decision not to
participate in the Review Procedure,
the Commission considered the fact that determinations with respect to the applicability of Section 30A to particular fact patterns
often would turn on judgments concerning motivation and intent.
It concluded that many questions of this nature do not easily lend
themselves to guidance on the basis of a written description of a
proposed transaction and that such questions could, in the first
instance, better be resolved by corporate officials and their profes233. Id
234. In fact one Justice Department attorney has indicated to the author that if a requesting party were to tell the Department that he had a particular time by which he needed a
decision, the Department would make every reasonable effort to speed up its response.
235. See FCPA comment Letters from the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., Breed,
Abbott and Morgan, Association of General Contractors, and ITT.
236. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(1), supra note 195.

237. SEC Release No. 34-17099, supra note 199.

sional advisors, who have access to all of the relevant facts bearing

upon intention. 238
The Commission's decision not to participate in the Review
Procedure has been criticized as a serious deterrent to businesses' use

of the Review Procedure. This expression of concern about the potency for differing interpretations by the FCPA's two enforcement

agencies did not go unrecognized. The Commission, while adhering
to its decision not to participate in the Review Procedure, did indi-

cate that, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, it would defer to the
Justice Department's determinations under the Procedure. 239 Thus,

any issuer who sought and obtained a favorable Review letter from
the Department prior to May 31, 1981 need not fear prosecution by
the Commission for that transaction. 2 °
(c) Department'sstatement ofpresent intentions only and only as
to FCPA provisions.-Some criticism has been directed at the Department's practice of stating only its present enforcement intention
regarding the proposed conduct. 24 ' Thus, some businessmen fear
that even after deciding favorably on a particular request, the Department later could bring an enforcement action against them with

respect to the same transaction which had been favorably reviewed.2 42 This situation certainly could arise because an FCPA review letter can be relied upon by the requesting party only "to the
extent the disclosure was accurate and complete and to the extent the
disclosure continues accurately and completely to reflect circumstances after the date of issuance of the review letter.

2 43

Thus, the

Department will not be bound by the decision in a Review letter if it
238. Id
239. Id In other releases the Commission did recognize that the FCPA had generated a
substantial degree of consternation among businessmen. See Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 16593 (Feb. 21, 1980); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17500 (Jan. 29, 1981).
240. SEC Release No. 34-17099, supra note 195. This enforcement policy expired on May
31, 1981. When the Commission initiated the enforcement policy concerning Section 30A of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it indicated that because it had received only a limited
response to its request for public comments on the impact and operation of Section 30A, it
could not fairly assess certain problems. The Commission had planned to evaluate the experience of the Justice Department on the basis of the Department's own evaluation of the Review
Procedure and to determine whether it should continue this policy or do something else. The
Justice Department never did assess the Review Procedure, and thus the Commission did not
have the opportunity to evaluate the Justice Department's experience. The Commission's enforcement policy concerning Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 may have
raised more questions than it answered, the most important of which are: how does the expiration of the Commission's enforcement policy affect issuers who seek and obtain favorable review letters after May 31, 1981? Should such issuers assume that the Commission unofficially
will continue the enforcement policy, or are those issuers in the same position as before the
policy was initiated, that is, subject to possible SEC prosecution for conduct which has received Justice Department approval?
241. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(h), supra note 195.
242. See FCPA comment letters from ITT and from Breed, Abbott and Morgan. See also
A PracticalLook, supra note 231, at 345.
243. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(k), supra note 195.

asserts that the disclosure was not accurate and complete, or if it
asserts that the disclosure no longer accurately and completely reflects the circumstances. Perhaps the Justice Department should not
be bound forever by a favorable review letter. A requesting party
cannot guarantee that the proposed conduct or transaction will be
implemented exactly as proposed, without a single change in the
facts or circumstances.
Others have criticized 2 " that the likelihood of a party being
prosecuted by the Department for the same conduct which was favorably reviewed is enhanced by the Department's practice of reviewing the proposed conduct only for possible violations of the
FCPA's antibribery provisions, and not for possible violations of
other federal statutes. The other federal statutes of particular concern to some businessmen are the Mail24 5 and Wire2 46 Fraud statutes. Section 50.18(1) of the Regulations Establishing the FCPA
Review Procedure supports this argument. 4 7 In relevant part, that
subsection states as follows: "An FCPA review letter will not...
affect the obligations of the requesting party. . . under any statutory
or regulatory provision other than those specically cited in the particular review letter. "248 Significantly, while a favorable review letter
under the Review Procedure does not preclude the possibility that a
party may be prosecuted under other federal statutes, the Department has not yet prosecuted in the overseas payments area under the
Mail Fraud statute.
The Review Procedure was established in response to concerns
which had been voiced about the meaning and applicability of some
of the FCPA's language. Its purpose is to provide companies with
some guidance as to how the antibribery provisions of the FCPA will
be applied to particular transactions. The Department of Justice
should not be expected to review proposed conduct for possible violations with respect to all federal statutes. The Review Procedure
was not established to replace corporate counsel by providing general legal advice.
(d) Lack of confidentiality -Perhaps of greatest concern to
businessmen, and the one concern that has the greatest deterrent effect on use of the Review Procedure is the possibility that sensitive or
244. See FCPA comment letter from ITT and from the Rule of Law Committee.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 1983) prohibits the use of the mails in furtherance of bribes
to government officials.
246. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. 1983) prohibits the use of wire in furtherance of bribes to
government officials.
247. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(1), supra note 195.
248. Id (emphasis supplied).

confidential information may be disclosed.24 9 On the one hand, a
requestor is required to be specific in its request. The request must
contain in detail all relevant and material information.25 ° On the

other hand, the requestor may consider some of that relevant and
material information to be sensitive or confidential. That information nevertheless must be submitted. If the request does not contain
all relevant and material information, regardless of how sensitive or

confidential that material may be, then the required certification by
the senior officer that the request contains a true, correct and com-

plete disclosure 25' would be false. In addition, if it is later asserted
that the disclosure was not accurate and complete, the requestor may
run the risk of prosecution.252
Although a review requestor may request that certain information not be made public, 253 unless that information falls within a
specific exemption category under the Freedom of Information Act,
it will be disclosed to an FOIA requestor. 254 Even if the information

is exempt from mandatory FOIA disclosure, it is still subject to some
disclosure through the Department's FCPA Review Release.2 55
Rather than risk the possibility that certain sensitive or confidential
information may be disclosed to the general public, including competitors, many companies would rather not seek reviews under the
Review Procedure.2 56

Some might argue that a balance between government interests
257
and business privacy interests in this area could never be struck
and that the only way to eliminate the Review Procedure's inherent

confidentiality problems would be to abolish the Procedure. Many
argue that the most useful and most effective replacement for the
Review Procedure would be the issuance of official guidelines, per249. See FCPA comment letters from: Breed, Abbott and Morgan; the Association of
General Contractors; ITT; and National Foreign Trade Council.
250. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(0, supra note 195.
251. Id
252. Id at 50.18.
253. Id at 50.18(o)(1).
254. Id See also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
255. 28 C.F.R. 50.18(o)(1), (2), supra note 195.
256. See FCPA comment letters from Breed, Abbott and Morgan and from the Association of General Contractors.
257. Some practical solutions have been suggested by at least one commentator. One
suggestion was that the Review Release "not disclose the names of the parties involved in
proposed transactions, the nature of the requesting company's business, or the country in

which the proposed conduct is to take place." Georges, A Questfor Clarity,supra note 172, at
88. In such an instance the Release would be like a hypothetical transaction. The same commentator suggested that the Department permit companies to seek the return of sensitive documents or that companies could provide the Department with access to the documents but never
actually release them to the government. In such instances companies' sensitive documents
would never become agency records and would therefore not be subject to disclosure under the

Freedom of Information Act.

haps including hypothetical examples.258
ProposedFederalLegislation Amending the FCPAm-S 708

C

Many people have called for congressional legislation to address
their FCPA concerns.25 9 The first piece of amending legislation was
introduced to Congress by Senator John H. Chafee of Rhode Island
during the last session of the 96th Congress.2 6° The bill failed to get
through the 96th Congress, but was reintroduced, as S.708, early in
the first session of the 97th Congress to the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs.261 On March 12, 1981 when S.708 was

introduced, the bill had fourteen cosponsors.26 2
A series of joint hearings 263 on the bill were held before the
Subcommittee on Securities and the Subcommittee on International
Finance and Monetary Policy. 26 The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs met in open executive session on
September 16, 1981 and voted 11-4 to report favorably on S.708,
with an amendment in the nature of a substitute.2 65
1. The Purpose.-The bill's stated purpose is to amend and
clarify the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The sponsors of
the bill believe that unnecessary problems have arisen under the
FCPA and that unless the Act is amended, U.S. businessmen will
continue to lose legitimate export opportunities and to incur unreasonable costs in their attempts to comply with the Act's provisions.
258.

See FCPA comment letters from the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. and from

TT.
259. "The Reagan Administration, The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the
Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, and numerous attorneys, accountants, and legal professors have all called for changes or clarifications to be made,

and guidance to be provided to American businesses." 127 CONG. REC. S2147 (daily ed.
March 12, 1981) (remarks of Senator Chafee).
260. 126 CONG. REc. S5874 (daily ed. May 28, 1980). Senator Chafee was not the only
member of Congress who felt the need for amending legislation. By August 28, 1980 the Cosponsors to S2763 included the following Senators:. Chafee of Rhode Island; Stevenson of
Illinois; Garn of Utah; Danforth of Missouri; Heinz of Pennsylvania; Dole of Kansas; Javits of
New York; Mathias of Maryland; Pressler of South Dakota; Schmitt of New Mexico; Percy of
Illinois; Thurmond of South Carolina; Bentsen of Texas; and Hayakawa of California. See
Note, The Criminalization ofAmerican ExtraterritorialBribery.- The Effect of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 645, 671 n.148 (1981).
261. 127 CONG. REC. S2147 (daily ed. March 12, 1981).
262. On March 12, 1981 when S.708 was introduced, the cosponsors of the bill included
the following Senators: Chafee (R.I.); Bentsen (Tex.); Danforth (Mo.); Garn (Utah); Dole
(Kansas); Goldwater (Ariz.); Hayakawa (Cal.); Lugar (Ind.); Mathias (Md.); Perty (Ill.);
Pressler (S.D.); Roth (Del.); Thurmond (S.C.); and Tower, (Tex.). Id By the time the bill was

reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on October 9,
1981, four other senators had been added to the list of cosponsors: D'Amato (N.Y.); Schmitt
(N.M.); Inouye (Hawaii); and Jepsen (Iowa).
263. Five hearings, extending over a period of three months, were held on the following
dates: May 20, and 21; June 16; July 23 and 24, 1981. S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1981).
264. Id
265. Id.

When introducing the bill, Senator Chafee stated: "If we expect
U.S. businesses to be aggressive and competitive abroad, we must
not encumber them with unnecessary barriers or restraints."26' 6
In the Committee-passed version of the bill, five congressional
findings were made.2 67 First, the enactment of the FCPA was a positive and significant step.26 8 Second, the Act has caused unnecessary
269
concern about the scope of legitimate overseas business activities.
Third, the accounting standards requirements are unclear and excessive and have caused costly and unnecessary paperwork burdens.2 7 °
Fourth, the SEC and the Department of Justice have not sufficiently
coordinated interpretations and enforcement practices with other
agencies;27 and fifth, it is in the interest of all countries to maintain
responsible standards of corporate conduct in foreign markets.27 2
Pursuant to the above findings, four congressional conclusions
were made.27 3 First, the principal objectives of the FCPA are desirable, beneficial and important and should remain the central intent of
the Act.274 Second, exporters should not be subjected to unclear,
conflicting demands by the SEC and the Justice Department.2 75
Third, general compliance and enforcement practices should be developed in accordance with considerations of other national objectives and other related civil and criminal statutes.27 6 Finally a
solution to the problem of corrupt payments demands an international approach, and international agreements should be initiated
and sought.27 7
The Chafee bill proposes a multitude of significant changes in
the FCPA, the first of which is an amendment of the Act's title. The
bill proposes that the Act be retitled the "Business Practices and
Records Act."' 27 8 The bill's sponsors thought that the Act's name
266. 127 CONG. REC. S2147 (daily ed. March 12, 1981) (remarks of Senator Chafee).
267. S.708, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1981).
268. Id § 2(a)(I).
269. Id § 2(a)(2).
270. Id § 2(a)(3).
271. Id § 2(a)(4). The other agencies with which the SEC and Justice Department insufficiently coordinated efforts were those responsible for international trade policy, export promotion, foreign policy, and international monetary policy.
272.

Id § 2(a)(5).

273. Id § 2(b). The original version of S.708 contained five congressional findings. The
finding that was deleted in the Committee-passed version of the bill was that the accounting
standards requirements of the Act should be integrated with concepts of materiality as they are
understood and interpreted in the context of generally accepted accounting principles. See id

§ 2(b)(3).
274.

Id § 2(b)(l).

275. Id § 2(b)(2).
276. Id § 2(b)(3). The other national objectives that should be considered are "underlying foreign policy relations, international trade, export promotion, (and) international mone"
tary policy ..
277. Id § 2(b)(4).

278. Id § 3.

should be changed for two reasons. 279 First, the Act's proscriptions
apply not only to companies that conduct business in foreign countries but also to U.S. companies that have no overseas business at all.
Second, the term "corrupt practices" has negative implications of

wrongdoing.
S.708 also makes some specific revisions of both the accounting
and antibribery provisions.
2.

The Accounting Standards.-To

address the concerns that

the requirements of the FCPA's accounting provisions were overly
burdensome and unnecessarily costly to businesses attempting to
comply with them, S.708 deletes the FCPA's separate record-keeping

requirement. 280 Thus, an enforcement action could no longer be
based solely on the fact that an issuer failed to make and keep accurate books and records. This revision reflects the Committee's belief
that the benefits derived from the FCPA's separate record-keeping

requirement do not sufficiently outweigh the interpretive problems
and unnecessary expenses which have resulted. 28' The bill would
incorporate the accurate record-keeping language into the system of
internal accounting controls requirement, however, as one of five

goals of such a system.282
When the SEC stated in one of its releases 283 that violation of
the FCPA's accounting provisions would be measured by a negligence standard, issuers feared that they would be prosecuted for innocent or inadvertent errors. The Committee believed, however,
that the purpose of the FCPA's accounting provisions was to proscribe knowing conduct and that therefore liability should be limited
to intentional conduct.2 84 Accordingly, S.708 would add a scienter
standard and would make an issuer subject to an enforcement action

under the accounting provisions only if it knowingly falsifies
279. S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1981).
280. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1981).
281. S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1981). The Committee Report indicated
four factors apart from a federal statutory record-keeping requirement which would provide
assurances that corporate records would be accurate: (1) accurate records are necessary for
corporate managers effectively to conduct the business of a company; (2) accurate records are
generally necessary to permit issuers to prepare financial statements and to comply with the
disclosure requirements of federal securities laws; (3) issuers' financial statements must be audited annually; and (4) the very existence and function of a system of internal accounting
controls should uncover record-keeping inaccuracies.
282. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(2)(E) (1981).
283. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24-14478 (Feb. 16, 1978). On January 13, 1981,
however, in a speech by former SEC Chairman Harold Williams to the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, it was clearly stated that the SEC was not interested in pursuing
inadvertent or insignificant errors, but rather would pursue only knowing or reckless misconduct. See Olson, SurprisingDegree ofAccord Foundon FCPA Change, Legal Times of Washington 33, June 29, 1981).
284. S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1981). The committee indicated that an
enforcement action should lie "only in cases where a conscious awareness of wrongdoing is
present. .. "

records, 285 knowingly fails to make or keep records, 2 86 knowingly
fails to maintain a system of internal accounting controls,2 87 or
knowingly attempts to circumvent the internal accounting
controls.2 88
The amendment provides further that if an issuer owns a minority interest in the subsidiary, then the issuer only needs to make a
good faith effort to use its influence to get the subsidiary to comply
with the accounting requirements of the Act.2 89 If an issuer can
demonstrate that good faith efforts were used, it will be conclusively
presumed to have complied with the Act. 29 ° This provision is intended to reflect the Committee's belief that any determinations of
violations of the internal accounting controls provision should look
to the conduct of the issuer rather than to the conduct of persons or
entities not subject to the issuer's control.2 9'
Unlike the FCPA, S.708 proposes a definition for the terms
"reasonable assurances" and "reasonable detail" as they are used in
the accounting provisions. Incorporated into the definition of those
terms are the "prudent individual" test and the "cost/benefit" test.2 92
3. TheAnuibriberyProvisions.-S.708 would repeal FCPA Section 103. Section 103 amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to prohibit foreign corrupt practices by issuers.29 3 The effect of the
repeal is to take away all the SEC's enforcement jurisdiction of the
antibribery provisions.29 4 The Justice Department would have sole
jurisdiction under the antibribery provisions for all civil and criminal enforcement. To effect its civil enforcement responsibilities, the
Justice Department would be given additional investigative authority including court enforceable subpoena authority to conduct civil
investigations.29 5
285.
286.
287.

S.708, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(b)(4)(A) (1981).
Id § 4(b)(4)(B).
Id § 4(b)(4)(C).

288.

Id

§ 4(b)(4)(D).

289. Id. § 5.
290. Id
291. S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981).
292. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1981).
293. Id § 5(a).
294. Id § 104(e)(1). The SEC would have civil enforcement jurisdiction only under the
internal accounting controls provisions. The Commission does not object to the bill's proposed
consolidation of authority in the Department of Justice. The Commission believes that as long
as it has authority to take appropriate action under the Federal Securities Laws in instances in
which foreign bribery involves a failure to disclose information material to investors, its principal role under the securities laws can be fulfilled. Hearings on S 708, supra note 74, at 288
(statement of John Shad, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
295. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 104(e)(2), (3) (1981). Currently the Department's only
means of compelling testimony or the production of evidence in foreign bribery investigations
is through the use of grand juries in cases in which criminal violation may have occurred. See
Hearingson S. 708, supra note 74 at 37 (statement of Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney
General).

S.708's amendment of Section 104 makes a number of revisions.
First, the term "domestic concern," as used in that section is defined
to include any entity which has a class of securities registered with
the SEC or which is required to file reports with the SEC.296 The
term "foreign official" is also defined to include any political party
or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office.297 As
a result of these broader definitions, the antibribery provisions are
more concisely written.
Another revision made by S.708, perhaps the most significant, is
the deletion of the "reason to know" standard. 298 The Committeepassed bill would replace this standard with language that would
hold a domestic concern liable only for those payments that the domestic concern corruptly "directed or authorized," expressly or by a
course of conduct, a third party to make to a foreign official. 299 As
with the "subsidiary" amendment to the accounting provisions, the
substitution of this new standard reflects the Committee's belief that
the conduct of the domestic concern should determine liability,
rather than the conduct of other parties over whom the domestic
concern may have little control.3 °
The bill explicitly would exclude five different categories of payments from the Act's bribery proscriptions. Excluded would be
(1) any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, the
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a
routine governmental action;30' (2) any payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value to a foreign official which is lawful in that
country; 30 2 (3) any payment, gift, offer or promise of anything of
value which constitutes a courtesy or a token of regard or esteem or
is in return for hospitality;3 3 (4) any expenditures associated with
the selling or purchasing of goods or services or with the demonstration or explanation of products; 3° 4 and (5) any ordinary expenditures
associated with the performance of a contract with a foreign government.30 5 In adopting these exclusions the Committee allegedly did
not intend to undermine the antibribery purpose of the Act. The
Committee believes that the proper focus is on the purpose of such
payments.
S.708 also proposes some new provisions regarding matters not
296. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104()(1) (1981).
297. Id § 104(0(2).
298. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FCPA's "reason to know" standard.
299. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(b) (1981).
300. S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1981).
301. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(c)(1) (1981).
302. Id § 104(c)(2).
303. Id § 104(c)(3).
304. Id § 104(c)(4).
305.

Id

§ 104(c)(5).

addressed in the FCPA. One such provision is the exclusivity provision for overseas bribery. Under that provision no criminal action
may be brought under the Mail and Wire Fraud statutes against a
domestic concern based on the theory that its corrupt payment
caused a foreign official to violate his fiduciary duty to his
country. 3°
Another new provision would provide that the Attorney General, after consultation with a number of other governmental agencies and representatives of the business community and the
interested public, shall assess the need for further guidance on the
antibribery provisions. The Attorney General would be authorized
30 7
to issue guidelines to assist in compliance with those provisions.
Further, S.708 would legislatively mandate that a review procedure,
the Business Practices and Records Act (BPRA) Review Procedure,
be established to provide responses to specific inquiries concerning
30 8
the Justice Department's enforcement intentions under the Act.
The BPRA Review Procedure would differ from the FCPA Review Procedure in two significant respects. First, a favorable review
opinion would be final and binding on all parties, subject to the discovery of new evidence. 3° Second, any and all documents or other
materials provided to, received by, or prepared in any government
department or agency in connection with a review request, or in connection with any investigations conducted to enforce the Act, would
3 10
be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
S.708 also calls for conforming changes in the Internal Revenue
Code's section relating to illegal payments to government officials or
employees. 31 That section disallows deductions for overseas payments which would be illegal under the laws of the United States.
S.708 would amend that section so that such deductions would be
disallowed only if the payments would have been illegal under the
Business Practices and Records Act. 31 2 Thus, if a facilitating payment were made to a foreign official for the purpose of securing performance of a routine governmental action, that payment could be
deducted as a foreign business expense because such a payment
would not be illegal under the Business Practices and Records Act.
Finally, S.708 recognizes the need for international agreements
to establish standards of conduct for international business practices
and strongly urges the President to pursue the negotiation of bilat306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id § 7. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1976) (the mail and wire fraud statutes).
S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(a)(1) (1981).
Id § 105(b).
Id
Id § 105(c). See also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) (Freedom of Information Act).
I.R.C. § 162(c)(1) (1954).
S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1981).

eral and multilateral agreements for the elimination of bribery.3 1 3
4. An Evaluationof S.708. -Although S.708 is a commendable
attempt to alleviate anxieties and concerns of U.S. companies required to comply with the FCPA, the proposed amendment moves
too far in the direction of the debasement of the original goals of the
Act. S.708 would exempt five categories of payments from the Act's
proscriptions on bribery, thus opening too many avenues for possible
abuse. Conceivably, at least one of the exemptions in S.708, that is,
any payment lawful under the laws and regulations of the foreign
country, could be especially susceptible to abuse.
S.708 would preclude any criminal action being brought against
a U.S. company under the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes based on
the theory that the company's corrupt payment caused a foreign official to violate his fiduciary duty to his country. If one of the purposes of S.708 is in fact to bring the "foreign antibribery statute"
closer in line with the domestic antibribery statute, then S.708 oversteps that line. If the criminal conduct of an American company
violates more than one United States statute, then there is no logical
reason why law enforcement officials should be limited in their prosecution of that criminal conduct.
S.708 would exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act all documents provided to, received by orpreparedin
any government department in connection with a review request or
any investigation to enforce the Act. While there is a need, in the
interest of U.S. companies, to protect confidential business information, this provision ignores many other interests, particularly the interests of the general public, which the FOIA was enacted to protect.
In addition, such an exemption would serve to diminish some of the
FCPA's deterrent effect. Investigations and prosecutions to enforce
the FCPA can be public information and therefore can lead to adverse publicity for the company and individuals involved. Under
S.708, such information could never be made public.
Although S.708 would provide many needed changes, other
changes would detract from much of what is effective in the FCPA.
Thus, S.708 is not the solution.
VI. Conclusion
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 was enacted to address the problem of corrupt practices, that is, the use of corporate
funds for the making of illegal payments to foreign government officials by American corporations to obtain or retain business. It was
313.

Id § 10.

thought that these practices held negative political, social and economic implications for the international business world in general,
and for the United States in particular. Thus the prevalence of the
practice of bribery by American companies was considered a serious
problem for the United States, a problem so serious that the United
States was prepared to take unilateral action to improve the quality
of business practices around the world.
The development of the FCPA over the past four and one-half
years has raised a number of concerns and some problems, not only
for those required to comply with the Act, but for those responsible
for its enforcement as well. Many of those concerns and criticisms
are valid. Although it is almost impossible to ascertain the costs of
the FCPA in terms of compliance costs and lost exports, the FCPA
does have a chilling effect on U.S. companies competing overseas.
When Congress enacted the FCPA it understood that the United
States was going to lose some business as a result of that law. Congress did not anticipate or intend, however, that U.S. companies
would have to walk away from business competition overseas because the law does not clearly define permissible or prohibited
conduct.
There is a need for a practical solution that would eliminate or,
at the very least, reduce many of the uncertainties and anxieties attendant to the Act and the enforcement of its provisions. Yet, there
is a greater need to carry forward the goals of the FCPA in its spirit.
Thus the task of finding "the solution" has become more difficult as
well as more imperative. Hopefully the recommendation contained
in the Appendix (R.A.W.-1982) meets that task and may be realized
in some measure. R.A.W.-1982 represents a compromise between
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and S.708. The compromise is not only in substance but also in form, for most of the provisions of R.A.W.-1982 are actual provisions of either the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act or S.708. A summary and an analysis precede
the proposed bill.

APPENDIX
Summary and Anaysis of R.A. W-1982
1. Amendment of Short Title
Sections 1 and 2 would change the short title of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 to the "Business Records and Foreign
Practices Act." This reflects agreement with S.708's attempt to remove the negative implications of wrongdoing.
2. Accounting Standards
Section 3(a) would delete the FCPA's separate recordkeeping
requirement and would incorporate the provision into the internal
controls system requirement. This reflects the belief that an efficient
system of internal accounting controls necessarily would uncover recordkeeping inaccuracies. This revision should help to reduce any
excessive compliance costs incurred by issuers.
Section 3(b)would interject into the Securities Exchange Act a
scienter standard for any violations of the accounting provisions.
This scienter standard differs from the one proposed by S.708, however, because it adds "recklessly" to "knowingly" to conform the bill
to the judicial construction of scienter in other provisions of the federal securities laws. Also, to address the concern about the liability
of issuers for their subsidiaries' noncompliance with the accounting
provision, a new paragraph (5) would be added to Section 13(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act. This paragraph differs from the one
proposed by S.708; it makes an issuer's "good faith efforts to use its
influence" a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the accounting provisions.
Section 3(c) would define "reasonable detail" and "reasonable
assurances" in terms of the reasonable businessmen and cost/benefit
tests.
3.

Transfer of Jurisdiction

Section 4 would repeal section 30A of the Securities Exchange
Act, which would take away the SEC's enforcement responsibility
for any of the antibribery provisions. This revision also would avoid
the problem of interagency coordination and should eliminate any
fears about the possibility of differing interpretations of enforcement
priorities and policies.
4. Foreign Payments
Section 5 represents the most significant of the compromises between the FCPA and S.708. Section 5(a) would prohibit a domestic

concern, including an agent, from making corrupt payments for the
purpose of influencing any act or decision of a foreign official in his
official capacity, or inducing him to do or omit to do any act in violation of his legal duty as a foreign official in his official capacity, or
inducing him to assist domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business, or directing business to any person.
5. Intermediaries

Section 5(b) would replace the FCPA's "reason to know" standard with a "knowing" standard and would prohibit the making of
corrupt payments to any person, knowing that all or a portion of that
payment would be passed on to a foreign official for the prohibited
purposes in subsection (a).
Section 5(c) would adopt S.708's "direct or authorize" standard.
Thereby a domestic concern would be prohibited from corruptly directing or authorizing, expressly or by a course of conduct, a third
party in furtherance of a corrupt payment.
6. Exemptions

Section 5(d) would exempt three types of payments from the
proscriptions of the antibribery provisions. The exempted payments
are: (1) facilitating or expediting payments; (2) courtesy or token
payments; and (3) extorted payments. The exemption of extorted
payments would require close and careful judgments. These three
exemptions reflect the belief that in none of these instances would
the payments be made corruptly or with an evil motive. Also, limiting the exemptions to these payments reflects a desire not to create
"back doors" for possible abuses of exemptions.
7

CreatePenalties

Section 5(e) would maintain the FCPA's civil and criminal penalties because high penalties are strong deterrents.
8. Authority For Civil Injunction and Investigation

Section 5() would adopt S.708's proposal to provide the Justice
Department with civil investigatory authority, including subpoena
authority.
9. Definitions

Section 5(g), like S.708, would define "domestic concern" to include issuers and "foreign official" to include government officers,
employees, political parties, party officials and party candidates. In
addition, the FCPA's definition of "interstate commerce" would be

retained. "Anything of value" is defined broadly to include any direct or indirect gain or advantage to a direct beneficiary or to any
third party beneficiary.
10. Authority to Issue Guidelines
Section 6(a) would adopt S.708's proposal to authorize the Attorney General to issue guidelines to assist in compliance with the
antibribery provisions.
Section 6(b) would legislatively mandate that a Business
Records and Foreign Practices Act Review Procedure be established.
The Review Opinions would be final and binding on all parties, subject to the discovery of new evidence.
Section 6(c) would protect the privacy rights of review requestors by providing that materials submitted in connection with a review request would be kept confidential. Also upon completion of
the review the Department of Justice would return any documents or
materials submitted by the requestor.
Section 6(d) would require the Department of Justice to make
special efforts to provide timely guidance for smaller businesses.
11.

InternationalEfforts

Section 7 strongly urges the President to pursue the negotiation
of international agreements.
12. InternalRevenue Code
Section 8 adopts S.708's provision to make conforming changes
in the Internal Revenue Code.
R.A. W -1982

A BILL

to amend and clarify the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, that this Act may
be cited as the "Business Records and Foreign Practices Act."
AMENDMENT OF SHORT TITLE
SEC. 2. Section 101 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 is amended to read as follows:
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 101. (a) This title may be cited as the "Business Records
and Foreign Practices Act." (b) Any reference to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 shall be deemed to be a reference to the
"Business Records and Foreign Practices Act."

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
SEC. 3 (a) Section 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 is amended to read as follows:
(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered
pursuant to section 12 of this title and every issuer which is required
to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title shall devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (A) transactions are executed in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization;
(B) transactions are recorded as necessary (i) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to
such statements, and (ii) to maintain accountability for assets;
(C) access to assets is permitted only in accordance
with management's general or specific authorization;
(D) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate
action is taken with respect to any differences; and
(E) for the purposes of subparagraphs (A) through
(D) of this paragraph, the issuer makes and keeps books, accounting
records and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer.
(b) Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
(4) A person shall be liable in any action or proceeding
arising under paragraph (2) only (A) for knowingly or recklessly falsifying, or causing
to be falsified, any book, accounting record, or account described in
paragraph (2)
(B) for knowingly or recklessly failing to make or
keep a book, record, or account described therein;
(C) for knowingly or recklessly failing to maintain a
system of internal accounting controls which is consistent with the
purposes of paragraph (2); or
(D) for knowingly or recklessly circumventing or
causing to be circumvented, the accounting controls established pursuant to paragraph (2):
(5) Where an issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or an issuer which is required
to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title holds 50 percent
or less of the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm,

the provisions of paragraph (2) require only that the issuer proceed
in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the
issuer's circumstances, including the relative degree of its ownership
over the domestic or foreign firm and under the laws and practices
governing the business operations of the country in which such firm
is located, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with paragraph (2). A demonstration of such issuer's good faith efforts to use
its influence shall create a rebuttable presumption that such issuer
has complied with the provisions of paragraph (2).
(c) Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
(b) For the purpose of this section, the terms "reasonable assurances" and "reasonable detail" mean such level of detail and degree
of assurance as would satisfy reasonable businessmen in the conduct
of their own affairs, having in mind a comparison between benefits
to be obtained and costs to be incurred in obtaining such benefits.
REPEALER; NEW BRIBERY PROVISION
SEC. 4 (a) (1) Section 103 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 is repealed.
(2) Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
repealed.
(3) Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
amended(A) by striking out "(other than section 30A)" in subsection (a); and
(B) by striking out subsection (c).
FOREIGN PAYMENTS
SEC. 5 Section 104 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
is amended to read as follows:
SEC. 104. (a) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, or
any officer, director, employee, or agent of such domestic concern or
shareholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce corruptly in furtherance of a payment, gift, offer, or
promise, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to any foreign
official for the purpose of (1) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, or inducing such foreign official to do or
omit to do any act in violation of his legal duty as a foreign official;
or

(2) inducing such foreign official to use his influence
with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, to
assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, or any
officer, director or employee, or agent of such domestic concern or
shareholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce corruptly in furtherance of a payment, gift, offer or promise., directly or indirectly, of anything of value to any person, while
knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be
offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official for any of the purposes set forth in subsection (a).
(c) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern or any
officer, director or employee, or agent of such domestic concern or
shareholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce corruptly to direct or authorize expressly or by course of
conduct, a third party in furtherance of a payment, gift, offer or
promise of anything of value to a foreign official for any of the purposes set forth in subsection (a).
(d) Subsections (a) (b) and (c) shall not apply to
(1) any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, as
distinguished from governmental action in which the exercise of
judgment by the foreign official is a significant factor;
(2) any payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything
of value which constitutes a courtesy, a token of regard or esteem, or
is in return for hospitality;
(3) any payment, or promise of anything of value to
a foreign official which is coerced or compelled by that foreign official by means of threats of injury to persons, property or loss of entire investment.
(e)(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any
domestic concern which violates subsection (a), (b) or (c) shall, upon
conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000.
(B) Any individual who is a domestic concern and who
willfully violates subsection (a), (b) or (c) shall, upon conviction, be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
(2) Any officer or director of a domestic concern, or stockholder
acting on behalf of such domestic concern, who willfully violates

subsection (a), (b) or (c) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more
than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(3) Whenever a domestic concern is found to have violated subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section, any employee of such domestic
concern who is a United States citizen, national, or resident or is
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (other than
an officer, director, or stockkolder acting on behalf of such domestic
concern) and who willfully carried out the act or practice constituting such violation shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(4) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) of
this subsection upon any officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder of a domestic concern, such fine shall not be paid, directly or
indirectly, by such domestic concern.
(f)(1) When it appears to the Attorney General that any domestic concern, or officer, director, employee, agent, or shareholder
thereof, is engaged, or is about to engage, in any act or practice constituting a violation of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section, the
Attorney General may, in his discretion, bring a civil action in an
appropriate district court of the United States to enjoin such act or
practice, and upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or a temporary restraining order shall be granted without
bond.
(2) For the purpose of all civil investigations which, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, are necessary and proper for the
enforcement of this Act, the Attorney General or any attorney or
attorneys of the Department of Justice designated by him are empowered to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses,
take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, or
other documents which the Attorney General deems relevant or material to the inquiry. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such documentary evidence may be required from any place
in the United States, or any territory, possession, or commonwealth
of the United States, at any designated place of hearing.
(3) In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued to, any person, the Attorney General may invoke the aid of
any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such
investigation or proceeding is carried on, or where such person resides or carries on business, to require the attendance and the testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, or other
documents. Any such court may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the Attorney General or attorney designated by
the Attorney General, there to produce records, if so ordered, or to
give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in ques-

tion; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. All process in any such
case may be served in the judicial district whereof such person is an
inhabitant or wherever he may be found. The Attorney General
shall have the power to make such rules relating to civil investigations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this subsection.
(g) As used in this section (1) The term "domestic concern" means (A) any individual
who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or (B) any
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business
trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has
its principal place of business in the United States, which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory,
possession, or commonwealth of the United States, which has a class
of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or which is required to file reports under section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
(2) The term "foreign official" means (A) any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for
or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality; or (B) any foreign political party or official thereof or
any candidate for foreign political office.
(3) The term "interstate commerce" means trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several states, or between any foreign country and any state or between any state and
any place or ship outside thereof. Such term includes the intrastate
use of (A) a telephone or other interstate means of communication,
or (B) any other interstate instrumentality.
(4) The term "anything of value" means any direct or indirect
gain or advantage, or anything that might reasonably be regarded by
the beneficiary as a direct or indirect gain or advantage including a
direct or indirect gain or advantage to any other individual or entity.
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE GUIDELINES.
SEC. 6 Title I of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
Guidelines and General Procedures
For Compliance
SEC. 105 (a) Not later than six months after the date of enactment of this section, the Attorney General, after consultation with

the United States Trade Representative, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of the Treasury and after
consultation with representatives of the business community and the
interested public through public notice and comment and in public
hearings, shall determine to what extent the business community
would be assisted by further clarification of section 104 of this Act
and shall, based on such determination and to the extent necessary
and appropriate, have the authority to issue (1) guidelines describing specific types of conduct associated
with common types of export sales arrangements and business contracts which the Attorney General determines constitute compliance
with the provisions of section 104 of this Act; and
(2) general precautionary procedures which issuers or domestic concerns may use on a voluntary basis to ensure compliance with
this Act. The guidelines and procedures referred to in the preceding
sentence shall be issued in accordance with sections 551 through 557
of title 5, United States Code.
(b) The Attorney General, after consultation with other federal agencies and representafives from the business community, shall
establish a Business Records and Foreign Practices Act Review Procedure for the purpose of providing responses to specific inquiries
concerning enforcement intentions under section 104 of this Act.
The Attorney General shall issue opinions, within thirty days, in response to requests from domestic concerns, regarding compliance
with the requirements of the provisions of section 104 of this Act.
An opinion that certain prospective conduct does not involve a violation shall be final and binding on all parties, subject to the discovery of new evidence. When appropriate, and at reasonable intervals,
the responses derived from the review procedure will be reviewed by
the Attorney General to determine whether such compilation of responses should be included in a new guideline pursuant to subsection (a).
(c) Any document or other material submitted to the Department of Justice, in connection with a request by a domestic concern
for a statement of present enforcement intentions under the Business
Records and Foreign Practices Act Review Procedure pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section shall be returned promptly to the domestic concern upon completion of the review or immediately upon
an applicant's withdrawal of such request. The Attorney General
shall protect the privacy of each applicant and shall adopt rules assuring that materials, documents, and information submitted in connection with a review procedure request will be kept confidential
and will not be used for any purpose that would unnecessarily discourage use of the review procedure. The review procedure shall be

developed and instituted in accordance with sections 551 through
557 and 701 through 706 of the title 5, United States Code.
(d) The Attorney General shall make a special effort to provide timely compliance guidance to potential exporters, and smaller
businesses, who as a practical matter are unable to obtain specialized
counsel on issues pertaining to this Act. Such assistance shall be limited to requests for enforcement intention disclosures provided for
under this Act, and general explanations of compliance responsibilities and of potential liabilities under the Act.
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
SEC. 7. All efforts should be made by the President to obtain
international agreements in as many forums as appropriate concerning the reporting and exchange of this information and the establishment of international standards and codes of conduct for the
operations of companies.
CONFORMING CHANGES IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE
SEC. 8. Paragraph (1) of section 162(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (relating to illegal payments to government officials or
employees) is amended (1) by striking out "the laws of the United States if such laws
were applicable to such payment and to such official or employee"
and inserting in place thereof "the Business Records and Foreign
Practices Act"; and
(2) by striking out "(or would be unlawful under the laws of
the United States)" and inserting in place thereof "(or would be unlawful under the Business Records and Foreign Practices Act)."

